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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Appellant,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

vs.
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
V. ROSS EKINS; S. 0. EKINS;

Case No. 860322

Respondents.
Respondents are not dissatisfied with appellant's
Statement of Issues, but would state the case somewhat
differently, as is set out below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action originally brought by a factoring
company (Heller) to foreclose on its security interest in the
accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, and other assets of
its client U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. (Rock Wool), and to
foreclose a subordinated trust deed that the guarantors V. Ross
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins (the Ekins) had given on their residence to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

secure their Guaranty (R. 2-14).

This action was, as to all

defendants, premature since it was commenced during an agreed and
unexpired extension of time, and was, as to the Ekins, filed in
direct violation of a written agreement of Heller that it would
take no such action until the Valley Bank seven (7) year trust
deed installment loan was paid in full.

Also, the Complaint

sought an amount which the trial court found to be unconscionably
excessive (Finding 9, Addendum 1).
Some ten months after it filed the foreclosure
Complaint, Heller filed an Amended Complaint and for the first
time pleaded a claim for judgment against the Ekins personally on
their written Guaranty (Amended Complaint, R. 303-339).

The

Ekins defended against this latter claim on the grounds, among
others, that they had long since been entirely exonerated from
their Guaranty as a matter of California law by Heller's
intentional or negligent conduct impairing the security to which
the Ekins looked for protection against loss on their Guaranty.
The Ekins took the position that the California law provided that
they were wholly released by Heller's impairment of its security,
and that even if the Court were to conclude that their release
was only pro tanto, the obligation of the Ekins under their
Guaranty had, nonetheless, been fully satisfied by the amount by
which they were exonerated.

The Ekins also claimed that Heller

had itself breached the contract first, having breached the
covenant of good faith which is, by statute in California, a part
of every contract; had failed to pursue in a commercially

-2-
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reasonable manner collection of the accounts receivable it had
taken over and foreclosed, and was thus barred from looking to
Rock Wool or the Ekins for a deficiency; and that Heller was,
under California lawf liable to the Ekins for their attorneys
fees and expenses.

Heller's form agreements provide that the law

of California is to be controlling, which provides for
reciprocity with respect to collection expenses and attorneys
fees •
The trial court found the issues in favor of the Ekins
and against Heller; made findings that Heller had, without the
consent of the Ekins, impaired its security for the Rock Wool
obligation (1) by negligently or intentionally failing to perfect
its security interest in the motor vehicles, (2) taking action
which impaired the accounts receivable, and (3) by causing the
going business value of the inventory to be lost; that the values
lost by Heller's impairment of the security was $110,249.00; that
Heller undertook to collect the accounts receivable, but failed
to do so in a commercially reasonable manner; that Heller so
conducted itself as to breach the implied covenant of good faith
which was a part of the Guaranty and the other contracts; that
Heller, in order to pressure the Ekins, had brought the
foreclosure action in breach of the Subordination Agreement which
barred it from taking action against the Ekins home; had failed
to establish what amount, if any, was due and unpaid from Rock
Wool; and was, under the contract provisions and the California
law, obligated to pay the Ekins their attorneys fees, costs, and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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expenses.

The trial court stated its conclusions of law and

entered judgment that the Ekins Guaranty had been released as a
matter of law by the conduct of Heller; that the trust deed on
the Ekins residence was also released; and that the Ekins recover
of Heller their pre-judgment and post-judgment attorneys fees,
costs and expenses (R. 1080-83).

These findings, conclusions,

and judgment are set out in full as Addenda 1 and 2 hereto.
Heller moved for a new trial (R. 1103-35).

The trial court

re-examined its decision and the record supporting it and denied
the motion (R. 1185-86).

t ;5:

REMEDY SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the judgment affirmed and
their post-judgment attorneys fees, costs, and expenses
determined and awarded.

r

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some of the facts are correctly recited by Heller in

Appellant's Brief; some are not.

In many instances Heller has

recited its preferred version of conflicting evidence as if
factual, despite a plethora of evidence supporting the trial
court's findings; and in other instances has simply ignored the
record, or absence of record.
Such of Heller's statements of fact as are material to
the questions presented in this appeal will be discussed below;
such as are merely provocative will be discussed only when
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essential to an understanding of the trial court's holding and
the factual premise for such holding.
1.

The Facts Surrounding the Origination of the Loan

to Rock Wool and the Duty to Perfect the Security.

On October 8

or 9, 1979, Jay Johnson, the Utah agent for Heller, met with V.
Ross Ekins, president and principal owner of Rock Wool, to
discuss factoring the accounts receivable of Rock Wool (Tr.
1560-62).

Rock Wool was in the business of subcontracting the

insulation work on construction projects and of selling
insulation products and services.

After discussing the terms,

Ekins told Johnson that he had some concerns about what it would
do if Rock Wool's customers knew their accounts were being
factored to Heller, and Johnson told him that Rock Wool's
customers were not advised of the factoring arrangement (Tr.
1562).

Ekins' testimony about this meeting and a later meeting

was bolstered by the notes he had made at those meetings.

He had

the original notes present at the trial for reference while
testifying and for examination by opposing counsel.

At the

meeting he showed Johnson the Rock Wool financial statements and
indicated that the net worth of Rock Wool was substantial (Tr.
1564).

Johnson took the Rock Wool financial statements, the

Ekins financial statements, the accounts receivable aging
schedule, and an accounts payable aging, put them in a package
and sent it to Heller in the hope that Heller would make the deal
and he would get a commission for placing the business (Tr.
1567).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Some two or three weeks later James Hillman, Heller's
assistant vice president, went to the Rock Wool office and met
with Ekins.

Hillman explained in detail the arrangement that

would be involved? that there would have to be a physical audit
by Heller's auditors; that Heller would have to have a security
interest in all of Rock Wool's assets, including its vehicles,
blowing machines, power tools, etc.; and that a personal guaranty
would be required from the Ekins (Tr. 1569-71).

When the

discussion turned to the personal guaranty and to requiring a
mortgage on the Ekins home to secure the guaranty, Ekins
objected, noted that the maximum credit to be extended would be
$125,000, that Rock Wool's assets were three or four times that
amount, and that he did not want to put up his home.

Hillman

said the trust deed and personal guaranty were conditions of the
loan.

Ekins was still concerned about protecting his home.

Hillman told Ekins that there were so many assets of Rock Wool
supporting the loan that the risk of loss was minimal. The
evidence on that point and the importance of the security to
Ekins shows clearly in the following:
"EKINS:

"'•"'

I was still concerned at that point. And
we talked about it further, and he gave
me some assurance that made it acceptable
to me. He said before we would go after
your home, all of these assets of the
corporation, the accounts receivable, the
inventory, the equipment, we record and
secure our interest in those so that
nobody else can get to them before we do.
Therefore those then are between us and
our having to come to you for any
personal guaranty or for action against
your home. Now, this is what he told me,
and I believed him. And on that basis I
-6-
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felt that the risk was very minimal, and
that's when I went home and told my wifef
the time I asked her to sign the
document." (Tr. 1573.)
It should be noted here that the Ekins have not claimed and do
not claim that Heller was bound by oral covenant to proceed
against the other security before proceeding against their home.
The testimony above goes to the point that Heller promised to
perfect the security and that Ekins relied upon the security to
stand between him and ultimate loss.
There is no question but that Rock Wool's motor
vehicles (described in detail in later testimony), are among the
items set out in the Chattel Mortgage between Rock Wool and
Heller (Exhibit "D"), as well as in the Financing Statement and
UCC-1 (Exhibit "E") which was filed to perfect the security
interest in the assets listed in the Chattel Mortgage.

On the

second page of the Chattel Mortgage Rock Wool covenants that all
of the mortgaged property is free and clear of liens except for
"liens on trucks, blowing machines, and other equipment financed
through banks," and under the U.C.C. in both California and Utah
the term "equipment" includes motor vehicles used primarily in
business.

California Civil Code, Sections 9103(3), 9109(2);

U.C.A., Sections 70A-9-103(3), 70A-9-109(2).
Heller admits that it did nothing to perfect its
security interest in the vehicles beyond filing the Combined
Security Agreement and UCC-1.

Mr. Hillman stated that he had

intentionally failed to perfect Heller's security interest in the
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vehicles—(under the law of both Utah and California this would
have required the Heller lien to have been entered upon the
titles of the motor vehicles)—and claimed that he had omitted
perfecting the interest in the vehicles at Ekins' request.

Ekins

flatly denied making any such request and the trial court held
that Mr. Ekins was the one who was telling the truth.
testimony on that point is:

*

Mr. Ekins1

?

"TANNER:

Directing your attentionf Mr. Ekinsf to
the matter of the mortgaged vehicles.
You heard Mr. Hillman testify that you
said to him in effect that the mortgaged
vehicles were encumbered and would he
please leave them out of the security.
Was that said by you to him?

EKINS:

Absolutely not.

TANNER:

Did you request at anytime in the
conversation with Mr. Hillman that the
mortgaged vehicles be left out of the
security and that the interest in them be
not perfected:

EKINS:

Absolutely not."

Failure to perfect the security in the motor vehicles was a
matter of real significance because the total value of the motor
vehicles in which Hillman failed to perfect Heller's security
interest was some $122,650 (Tr. 1591-92).
At the time of the transaction the Ekins did not know
what steps were required to perfect Heller's security interest in
the vehicles and equipment, and relied on Heller to take care of
perfecting the security because "he [Hillman] told me they would"
(Tr. 1597, 1599):
"TANNER:

What did he tell you with respect to who
would do the perfecting on the - -
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EKINS:

He (Hillman) said Heller would."

Ekins further testified that he read the documentation
including the UCC-l's, supposed they perfected the security in
all the Rock Wool assets including the vehicles, and wanted them
to do so because the security given Heller by Rock Wool was what
stood between him and having to take a loss on the personal
Guaranty he and Mrs. Ekins had signed, a consideration which was
vital to his signing the documents (Tr. 1607-09).
2.

The Ekins Personal Guaranty.

The Guaranty signed

by the Ekins is especially important to this appeal, because its
contents are the sole basis for Heller's contention that the
trial court erred in finding that the Ekins had not consented to
impairment of the security.

In that regard it should be noted

that the copy of the Guaranty appended to Appellant's Brief as
"Appendix ii" is not a true copy of the document signed, instead
it is a copy of Exhibit "G" which was offered by Heller and was
refused admission into evidence

because it contains underlining

which was not present on the document at the time of its signing.
A copy of the Guaranty without extraneous writing or underlining
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit "F."

A copy of the Guaranty

which was admitted as Exhibit "F" is appended hereto as Addendum
3.

Presumably Heller's switch of these exhibits is inadvertent.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that there was no
underlining on the Guaranty when it was signed.
3.

The Valley Loan and Heller's Subordination

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Agreement.

In 1981 the Ekins were called on a mission for their

church which would require them to be away for three years, so
they needed to get their financial affairs in order.

They had an

existing short-term loan at Walker Bank with a balance of
$67f000.00 that came due in full every 60-90 days.

It was

secured by a mortgage on the Ekins home which was prior to the
Heller Trust Deed.

Valley Bank agreed to lend the Ekins the

$67,000.00 on a seven (7) year loan payable at $1,351.74 per
month (Exhibit EE) if and only if Heller would subordinate and
agree not to foreclose its lien on the home until the installment
loan was paid in full (Tr. 1614-19).

It was vital to the Ekins

that their home be protected so long as their payments were
current.

They negotiated with Hillman to get the Subordination

Agreement; transmitted it to Valley Bank and relied on it to
safeguard their home while they were gone (Tr. 1636-37).
Although the Ekins did not sign the Subordination
Agreement—there was neither a place for them to sign nor a need
for their signature—they obtained it, were understood by all to
be the beneficiaries of it, and justifiably relied upon it.
It should also be noted that the copy of the
Subordination Agreement appended to Appellant's Brief as
"Appendix iii" is not a true copy of the document signed and
admitted into evidence as Exhibit DD.

It contains pencil

underlining and circling which was not on the document signed.

A

copy of the Subordination Agreement which was admitted as Exhibit
DD is appended hereto as Addendum 4.

Presumably Heller's switch

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of these exhibits is also inadvertent.
4.
Bankruptcy.

Rock Wool's Financial Deterioration and Eventual
There was substantial discussion and testimony

respecting Rock Wool's financial condition in 1982.

In his

testimony Ross Ekins pointed out that the financial statements
showed the assets at historical cost and not at the then present
market value (Tr. 1747-49) and that in order to have an
understanding of Rock Wool's financial condition, the difference
between market value and book value must be considered.
In mid-January, 1983, Heller changed the rules by
which it determined which accounts were qualified accounts for
purposes of lending and threw the Rock Wool account into such a
negative security position as to assure that the obligation was
beyond Rock Wool's ability to bring current.

Thereafter, Heller

sent notices to all of Rock Wool's customers which had stale
balances on them, even though Heller knew or is charged with the
knowledge that it would receive a list of the current balances
within the next two or three days.

The effect of those notices

and of Heller's use of outdated account balances in their
preparation was to shut off the payments by the existing
customers and to cause the contractors to cease to deal further
with Rock Wool as an insulating subcontractor.

The precise

references to the record are contained in Point II of the
Argument below.
The trial court found that the conduct of Heller
was the cause of the eventual destruction of Rock Wool as an
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operable business concern and that Heller knew its conduct would
cause Rock Wool's debtors "to stop or slow down the payment of
their accounts and quit doing business with Rock Wool" (Finding
No. 5; Addendum 1).
Thereafter, on March 30, 1983, Heller commenced
suit to foreclose the Ekins home, claiming that $116,700.43 was
due from Rock Wool to Heller (R. 3) and was the amount of the
lien on the Ekins house.

In fact the amount then due according

to Heller's own books and records was some $62,000.00 (Tr. 1789),
and even that figure erroneously overcharged Rock Wool by some
$8,279.00 (Tr. 1638 et seq.).

The trial court found Heller's

demand to be unconscionably excessive (Finding 9 ) .
In the same suit in which Heller sought to
foreclose on the Ekins home, it foreclosed on the accounts
receivable, inventory, equipment, and all other assets of Rock
Wool described in the security agreements and UCC-1.

After

making valiant efforts to try to pay off the Heller account, Rock
Wool was finally forced to file bankruptcy in December, 1983,
some nine (9) months after Heller's foreclosure suit, at which
time the trustee in bankruptcy took the position that it, not
Heller, was the owner of the vehicles because the Heller security
interest was not perfected in the manner required by law.

Some

time after Rock Wool filed in bankruptcy Heller filed an Amended
Complaint seeking personal judgment against the Ekins under their
Guaranty.

The Rock Wool bankruptcy case was still open at the

time of the trial and judgment below, and will apparently remain
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open pending this appeal.
In the case at bar Heller failed to establish the
amount, if any, owed it by Rock Wool (Finding 13). Heller has
not appealed from that Finding and is, therefore, bound by it.
Further facts will be discussed under the respective
issues.

ARGUMENT
Introduction
The alleged errors on which Heller bases its appeal
fall into natural groupings as follows:
1.

There were reversible errors in law.

Heller claims

the trial court erred in its decisions as to the law governing
the case in that (a) it failed to conclude that the language of
the Guaranty waived or consented to impairment of the collateral;
(b) the Ekins position as Rock Wool's controlling shareholders
precludes them as a matter of law from claiming to be discharged
from the Guaranty; and (c) the controlling shareholders of Rock
Wool had an affirmative duty to see that Heller perfected the
security interest in Rock Wool's vehicles.
2.

There were errors in factual determinations.

Heller claims the evidence in the record is not sufficient to
sustain certain of the trial court's findings of fact;
3.

There was an error in admitting an appraisal.

Heller claims the trial court erred in admitting Robert Berman's
appraisal of the value of certain motor vehicles which Berman had

-13-
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never seen;
4,

There was an error in the ruling on attorneys fees*

Heller claims the trial court should not have awarded attorneys
fees to the Ekins; and
5.

Heller did not receive a fair trial.

Heller claims

that there were ex parte communications between the Ekins
attorney and the trial judge which prevented Heller from getting
a fair trial.
All of the points advanced on appeal by Heller were
carefully briefed and extensively argued in the trial court and
rejected as lacking merit.

Accordingly, the record contains

extensive briefing which deals with some of the arguments in
greater detail than is possible within the confines of the
Appellate Briefs.

Those trial level memoranda will be referred

to in connection with the appropriate issues and cited as to
their location in the trial record for such use as supplemental
material as the Court may desire.

POINT I
The Guaranty neither waives the Ekins right to
claim exoneration by Heller's impairment of
the security given by Rock Wool nor consents
to impairment.
In summary, the Ekins argue under this point that:
1.

The portion of the second paragraph of the Guaranty

that relieves Heller of the duty of exhausting, or even pursuing,
its collateral before calling on the guarantors (Ekins) for
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payment does not constitute a consent to the release or
impairment of collateral; and
2.

The second sentence of the second paragraph of the

Guaranty waives "notice • . . of the release of security," but
does not waive or consent to either the release or the impairment
of security.
The precise portions of the Guaranty (see Addendum 3
for full text of Guaranty) involved in the interpretation issues
read as follows:
"The undersigned also waive notice of any
consents to the granting of indulgence or
extension of time payment, the taking and
releasing of security in respect of any said
receivables, agreements, obligations,
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed
hereunder, or your accepting partial payments
thereon or your settling, compromising or
compounding any of the same in such manner and
at such times as you may deem advisable,
without in any way impairing or affecting our
liability for the full amount thereof; and you
shall not be required to prosecute collection,
enforcement or other remedies against the
Debtor or against any person liable on any
said receivables, agreements, obligations,
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed, or
to enforce or resort to any security, liens,
collateral or other rights or remedies thereto
appertaining, before calling on us for
payment; nor shall our liability in any way be
released or affected by reason of any failure
or delay on your part so to do."
In the course of the trial and the motion for a new
trial Heller argued that the second sentence of the second
paragraph of the Guaranty should be interpreted as consenting to
the "release" of security, and, therefore, under the doctrine of
this Court in the recent case of Continental Bank v. Utah
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Security Mortgage, 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985), which held that a
consent to release is also a consent to impairment.
consented to impairment.

The Ekins

The trial court held that the Ekins did

not consent (Finding 1). Therefore, the trial court rejected
Heller's contention that the language constituted a consent to
release.

As set forth more fully in the Memorandum filed by the

Ekins below (R. 677-89), and adopted by implication by the trial
court, the language cited does nothing more than waive "notice"
of extension of time, taking or releasing security, accepting
partial payment, etc.—which notice is, unless waived, required
under California law (Sumitomo Bank of California v. Iwasaki, 447
P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968).

Waiver of such "notice," does not

constitute waiver or consent to impairment of the security.
In its brief on appeal, Heller has apparently accepted
that portion of the trial court's ruling, but now contends that
the portion of the second paragraph of the Guaranty which
provides that Heller need not proceed against the collateral
before proceeding against the Ekins has the legal effect of
consenting to the impairment of collateral.

Such consent would,

if given, bar the Ekins from access to the exoneration provisions
of Section 2819, C.C.C.

However, no such consent to release, and

thus, by implication, to impairment is included in the
Heller-drafted Guaranty, and the suggestion that Continental
Bank, supra, holds that a provision that simply waives the
requirement that the creditor first pursue its collateral
constitutes a consent to release or impairment is a perversion of
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the teaching of Continental Bank.
As Heller contends, the interpretation of the
provisions of the Guaranty is a matter of law on which the
Supreme Court, under certain circumstances, need not give any
particular weight to the trial court's interpretation.

But this

is true when, and only when, the facts constituting the
background against which the contract is to be considered are
agreed or undisputed.
1.

Such ^s the case here.

Those facts are:

The law of California is the governing law and the

California Civil Code, as proven factually by Exhibit 1, includes
the following sections which have application to this issue:
"Section 2787. [Former distinctions
abolished: Surety or guarantor
defined: Guaranties of collection:
Continuing guaranties]
The distinction between sureties and
guarantors is hereby abolished. The
terms and their derivatives, wherever
used in this code or in any other
statute or law of this State now in
force or hereafter enacted, shall
have the same meaning, as hereafter
in this section defined. A surety or
guarantor is one who promises to
answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another, or
hypothecates property as security
therefor. Guaranties of collection
and continuing guaranties are forms
of suretyship obligations, and except
in so far as necessary in order to
give effect to provisions specially
relating thereto, shall be subject to
all provisions of law relating to
suretyships in general.
"Section 2845. [Surety may require
creditor to proceed against
principal: Effect of neglect to
proceed]
A
surety may require the creditor,
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subject to Section 996.440 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to proceed
against the principal, or to pursue
any other remedy in the creditor's
power which the surety cannot pursue,
and which would lighten the surety's
burden; and if the creditor neglects
to do so, the surety is exonerated to
the extent to which the surety is
thereby prejudiced.
"Section 2819. [Acts operating to
exonerate generally]
A surety is exonerated, except so far
as he may be indemnified by the
principal, if by any act of the
creditor, without the consent of the
surety the original obligation of the
principal is altered in any respect,
or the remedies or rights of the
creditor against the principal, in
respect thereto, in any way impaired
or suspended.
"Section 2848. [Subrogation of
surety to creditor's rights]
THE SURETY ACQUIRES THE RIGHT OF THE
CREDITOR. A surety, upon satisfying
the obligation of the principal, is
entitled to enforce every remedy
which the creditor then has against
the principal to the extent of
reimbursing what he has expended, and
also to require all his co-sureties
to contribute thereto, without regard
to the order of time in which they
become such."
2«

The Guaranty is Heller's usual and required form,

and Heller's staff was, as to all of its printed material, the
scrivener.
3.

At the time the Guaranty was signed, Heller was a

very large national financing institution; Rock Wool was a small
local company; and the Guaranty form was presented to the Ekins
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
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Given the presence of these elements, any lack of
clarity, ambiguity, or uncertainty of meaning is Heller's
responsibility; the terms must be construed most favorably to the
Ekins; and since the elements of a contract of adhesion are
present and Heller contends that the record is such as to make
the interpretation a matter of law only, untainted by dispute or
issue of fact, the rule of strictissimi juris should apply.
The dispute before this Court is whether, interpreted
in light of the above circumstances, the Guaranty, by necessary
import of its terms, contains the consent of the Ekins that
Heller may impair the security or waives the Ekins right to claim
the protection of the California Civil Code provision (C.C.C.,
Section 2819) that a guarantor is released if the creditor
impairs the security given for the obligation guaranteed.
The Ekins claim they are entitled to have the Guaranty
construed most favorably to them because Heller is the scrivener
and because the relationship of the parties is such as to make
the Guaranty a contract of adhesion, thus requiring application
of the rule of strictissimi juris.
The background against which any guaranty agreement is
to be construed must include the economic realities common to all
such relationships.

Any reasonable person contemplating a

guaranty of the obligations of another must, as Ross Ekins1
testimony directly and by reasonable implication shows he did,
consider these questions:
1.

Are the assets given by the principal debtor to
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secure the debt adequate to liquidate the debt even if the
principal debtor becomes bankrupt?

If so, the credit will be

paid in full from liquidation of the security.
2.

Where, as in California, the guarantor can, absent

waiver, require the creditor to look to its security before
looking to the guarantor, and the Guaranty Agreement waives that
right, what is the effect?

Under California Law (C.C.C., Section

2848, supra), the guarantor is subrogated to the creditor's
position in the security if the guarantor pays the debt.

For

that reason it is vital that the security not be released or
impaired.

The economic difference when the creditor is not

required to pursue the collateral first is that the guarantor may
have to foreclose on the security instead of the creditor doing
so.

Where an attorneys fee provision is present, guarantor

recovers both the amount he had to pay the creditor and his costs
of foreclosing and, so long as the security has not been
impaired, still has the protection for which he bargained in the
first place.
What, then, of the pivotal problem, interpreting the
Guaranty Agreement?

As Heller points out on pages 20 and 21 of

its Brief, the Ekins have waived the requirement of the
California Code that Heller proceed against the security before
calling on the Guaranty.

Under Section 2845, supra, such a

waiver permits Heller to proceed against the Ekins without first
foreclosing the security and thus permits Heller to require the
Ekins to invoke the protection of the security by way of their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statutory subrogation.

However, in the case at bar Heller did

not take advantage of this right, instead Heller took control of
the receivables, started the present suit, foreclosed on Rock
Wool's assets, and tried to foreclose on the Ekins home. Nine
months later, Heller went against the Ekins on the Guaranty, and
now Heller contends that the language giving it power to avoid
the requirement of Section 2845 has a dark and sinister side
effect—that it has the effect in law of a consent that Heller is
free to release, impair, or otherwise diminish or do away with
the security which is the only corpus available to the Ekins for
reimbursement.
Heller cites Heller v. Cox, et al., 343 F. Supp. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) for the proposition that the wording of the Ekins
Guaranty constitutes consent to impairment of collateral. The
Cox case is inapposite.

It is a New York Federal District Court

case and there is no reason to suppose that the law of New York
is the same as California's.

The issue in Cox was whether there

was res judicata; in Cox Heller had not impaired any of the
collateral, and the discussion of the scope and nature of the
claimed waiver and consent was dicta.
Heller v. Wilkinson, 627 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1983), also
does not stand for the point for which Heller cites it. This
becomes apparent when the rest of the sentence truncated by
Heller is supplied.

Wilkinson is dead-on-point favorable to the

Ekins claim that once Heller took over collection of the accounts
receivable in early 1983, it had to collect them in a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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commercially reasonable manner.

The trial court, in a finding

not challenged by Heller, found that Heller did not proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner (Finding 8, Addendum 1).

This has

the effect in both Utah and California of releasing Rock Wool
either totally or pro tanto from liability for a deficiency.

If

Rock Wool is released, the Ekins Guaranty is automatically
reduced, either totally wiped out or reduced pro tanto to the
extent of $41,649.00 (see Finding 6).
Had Heller quoted the entire sentence from Wilkinson,
the affirmance of the Ekins argument would have been clear.

The

complete sentence is:
"Hence, under the terms of the agreement, the
defendants could not compel Heller to go
against the security, but once Heller elected
to do so, he was required to do so in a
commercially reasonable manner."
Nothing could be more abundantly clear than the fact
that Heller with its long business experience and staff of
attorneys could have said simply, shortly, and directly that the
guarantor consented to the impairment of security or waived its
right to enforce the provisions of Section 2819, if it intended
that its Guaranty form have that effect.

In California there is

no need for the reader to be put to a determination of whether
the fancy and complex language permitting Heller to go against
the guarantor without having first exhausted its security is by
some implication, projection, rationalization, or contortion also
a consent or waiver of the protection of Section 2819.

Nor is

there any need for the reader to have to worry about the possible
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implications of the waiver provision of the Guaranty's second
paragraph, does it waive notice or does it waive release?. . Had
Heller wanted the Guaranty to be construed as containing a waiver
of Section 2819, it could have said so in plain and simple words,
but it didn1t.
Heller cites American Security Bank v. Clarno, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 127, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874 (Cal. App. 1984), in support of
its position.

However, a close reading of the case reveals that

the reason the guarantors involved there were not released under
Section 2819 was not that their guarantee was absolute and
unconditional or because it did not require the creditor to
proceed against the collateral, but rather was that the
guarantors had waived their rights under Section 2819 when they
had "consented" to the "substitution, exchange, or release of all
or any part of the collateral."

Supra at 131.

It was because

the guarantors had consented to the release of collateral and
that they could not raise the impairment of collateral defense;
it was not because they had signed an "unconditional guaranty."
As the Ekins did not consent to a release or other
impairment of collateral, Clarno is distinguishable and does not
support the proposition that the Ekins cannot assert Section 2819
as a defense to liability in the case at bar.

For a more

extended discussion of the issues raised by Clarno refer to the
Memorandum at R. 674-677.
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POINT II %
The record contains adequate evidence to
sustain each of the trial court's findings
which is challenged by Appellant, However,
even if the challenged findings were deletedf
the remaining findings sustain judgment for
the Ekins.
Before considering whether the findings that are

challenged are supported by the record, it should be observed
that the findings which are not challenged are sufficient by
themselves to require judgment in favor of the Ekins. The
Findings and Conclusions are set out in full as Addendum 1 at the
end hereof, and the Judgment as Addendum 2.

The trial court

found that Heller had impaired its security by three acts or
omissions:
1.

Heller failed to perfect its security interest in

the motor vehicles, which failure materially impaired that
security (Finding 4, Addendum 1).
2.

Heller impaired its rights and remedies [security

interest] in the accounts receivable (Finding 5).
3.

Heller impaired its security interest in the

inventory (Finding 5).
Any one of these impairments, each of which is material
as is shown by Finding 6, is sufficient under Section 2819,
California
Guaranty.

Civil Code, supra, to exonerate the Ekins from their
It only takes one.

As to the value of the vehicles

lost to the Ekins as security by Heller's impairment, Heller has
claimed that the Berman appraisal is inadmissible.
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This claim is

without merit; however, even if Heller were correct the trial
court could not have concluded that the value of those vehicles
was so insubstantial as to render the impairment immaterial.
The portion of Finding 5 that finds that Heller
impaired the accounts receivable and of Finding 6 establishing
the amount of that impairment as being $41,649.00 are sufficient
standing alone to require judgment for the Ekins under California
law unless this Court finds that the very terms of the Guaranty
constitute consent to such impairment.
Nonetheless, appellant argues that certain of the trial
court's findings of fact are erroneous and that argument, which
is fallacious, must be answered.

The findings Heller disputes

are (1) those acts and omissions found to constitute a breach of
Heller's obligation of good faith (Appellant's Argument V ) , and
(2) that Heller impaired Rock Wool's inventory in the amount of
$25,000.00 or any other amount (Appellant's Argument VI).
The legal standard for determining the sufficiency of
evidence to sustain a finding is stated somewhat differently in
different decisions of this Court.

In Bennion v. Hansen, 699

P.2d 758 (Utah 1985), the standard is said to be:
"On appeal, the findings of the trial court
will not be disturbed unless there is no
substantial record evidence to support them.
See, e.g., Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus,
Utah, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (1981). In reviewing
the evidence, we view it in the light most
favorable to the trial court. See, e.g.,
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 254, 495
P.2d 28, 29 (1972)
In Union Pacific Railroad Company, 649 P.2d 48 (Utah
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1982), the standard is described in this fashion:
"As we have freguently stated, in a non-jury
trial it is the trial judge's prerogative to
find facts—including judging the credibility
of witnesses, weighing the reliability of
other evidence, and drawing fairly derived and
reasonable inferences therefrom. On appeal
this Court reviews the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court findings.
Where there is competent evidence to support
the findings this Court must sustain them
(citing cases . ) "
r?

*>

It follows that the challenged findings will not be

disturbed on appeal unless the record contains no evidence to
support the finding, or the evidence is insubstantial, or the
evidence is incompetent.

In the case at bar, the record contains

an abundance of competent, compelling evidence, often unrebutted,
to support each of the findings of fact objected to by Heller.
We will discuss the challenged findings of fact in the order of
their presentation in Heller's Brief:
1.. The findings respecting bad faith.

These findings

are contained in Finding 9 which reads as follows:
"9. The California Civil Code imposes on all
parties to a contract an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement.
Heller has breached this obligation in its
enforcement of the contracts on which it
claims the Ekins are liable (a) by changing
the operating rules on Rock Wool unilaterally
and creating an insuperable negative balance
of accounts receivable security; (b) by giving
notice to Rock Wool's customers which were
taken from an obsolete customer list known by
Heller to contain obsolete balances, and doing
so at a time when Heller knew it would receive
in a day or two the regular monthly updated
list from Rock Wool containing current
information; and (c) by attempting to coerce
the Ekins by filing suit without notice or
demand at a time Heller knew the Ekins' were
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gone from Utah on a multi-year assignment, by
claiming an unconscionably excessive amount,
and by seeking the immediate appointment of a
receiver to take possession of Ekins1 home and
having it sold at a sheriff's sale, all at a
time when Heller was bound by contract not to
take action against the Ekins' home."
That the California law imposes a duty of good faith in
all contracts has not been disputed by Heller.

The trial court

found Heller to have breached that covenant in three respects.
Does the record support this?
a.

Yes, as follows:

That Heller changed its rules and created an

insuperable negative balance is supported by:
(1)
stating.

The testimony of David Ekins (Tr. 1775-82) so

The following extracts are on point:

"TANNER:

"With respect to that subject, will you
tell us what happened and whether it is a
matter of any significance in the course
of the operation of this business?

EKINS:

There's a great deal of significance.

TANNER:

First, explain to us what happened.

EKINS:

On Exhibit D-9, report number 673, I had
a telephone call from Jim Hillman, Walter
E. Heller Western, who informed me that
— that they have been ever since the
beginning of the agreement miscalculating
apparently or misinterpreting rather our
accounts receivable aging such that I
needed to change the hold-out figure
which is shown on line 6 to $171,000.
This had the formula effect of having our
loan availability a minus $52,196.96.
. . .

TANNER:

Had Heller given you any notice or
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knowledge prior to the time of the
telephone call to which you just referred
that there would be the change made to
which you just referred?
EKINS:

None whatsoever.

TANNER:

Was the interpretation which Heller had
utilized up to and including the time
shown in Exhibit 8 different from the
interpretation which is embodied in
Exhibit 9? I'm speaking of Heller's
interpretation of the accounts receivable
and those which were qualified and not
qualified to be considered.

EKINS;

Their interpretation prior to that time
was the same as ours.

TANNER:

And were you — would you be able — did
you expect that you would be able to
operate effectively under the
interpretation of the aging schedules
that was reflected in Mr. Hillman's
message to you and in Exhibit S?

TANNER:

After the change?

EKINS:

Yes.

TANNER:

No."

(2) The testimony of James Hillman (Heller's vice
president) explaining the effect of the change in accounting
requirements and the significance to Rock Wool.

This testimony

is set out in the copy of Tr. 1417-19 attached hereto as Addendum
5, which is entirely consistent with the David Ekins testimony
and establishes that Heller knew what effect the change would
have on Rock Wool.
(3) The testimony of V. Ross Ekins (Tr. 1685) as
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follows:
"EKINS:

You want me to tell you what the factors
were that caused us to [file bankruptcy]?

ANDERSON:

Yes, sir.

EKINS:

I would love to.

EKINS:

The straw that broke the camel's back,
and we had a lot of other troubles, was
when Heller changed their formula for
arithmetically determining the figure
they always gave to us each month,
telling us what the unqualified accounts
receivable were which had the net effect
of putting us into a deficit position, as
has been testified to here, by some
$55,000 which turned off cash flow,
positive cash flow, over night which
virtually — "

b.

That Heller sent notices to Rock Wool's customers

demanding that they pay Heller incorrect amounts which Heller had
taken from a stale list when a new and current list was expected
by Heller and coming from Rock Wool in the next few days is
established by:
(1) The date the notices were prepared and sent
(see Exhibit T, exemplar of notice, attached hereto as Addendum
6).
(2) Hillman's testimony that on February 7, 1983,
he instructed his staff to send the notices to Rock Wool's
customers (Tr. 1343) and didn't know what accounts aging list he
had on hand or when Heller usually received its monthly update
from Rock Wool, but that current accounts receivable aging lists
were supposed to be in Heller's hand by the 10th of each month
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Tr. 1315-18).
(3)

David Ekins testimony that he sent Heller an

updated accounts receivable aging list between February 10th and
15th, as was his custom (Tr. 1787-88).
(4)

When the notices were sent out Rock Wool began

getting angry calls from debtors who said the accounting
information was incorrect, which was true, and the contractors
held off payment (Tr. 1784-85).
c.

That Heller attempted to coerce the Ekins into

paying the Rock Wool debt (i) by suing to foreclose on their
home, (ii) without prior notice, (iii) while the Ekins were away
on a long-term assignment, (iv) by claiming an unconscionably
excessive amount and seeking appointment of a receiver, and (v)
all at a time when Heller was bound by contract not to foreclose
on the Ekins home is established by:
(1)

Heller's Subordination Agreement (Exhibit DD

and Addendum 4 hereto), which, paragraph 10 of the Findings
shows, precluded Heller from foreclosing on the Ekins home until
the Ekins had paid off the Valley Bank trust deed (some seven (7)
years from May, 1981) or had defaulted in making their payments
to Valley Bank.

Heller started its foreclosure action on March

30, 1983 (Tr. 2, showing filing date of Complaint) even though
the Ekins had never defaulted in their payments to Valley Bank.
(2)

That the Ekins were on a three (3) year church

assignment in Tennessee from June, 1981 until June, 1984 is
acknowledged by all parties.

,f
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(3)

In the March, 1983 foreclosure action Heller

claimed $116,700.43 to be due from Rock Wool (Tr. 4, page 3 of
the Complaint) when Heller's books showed only between $57,000.00
and $62,000.00 to be due from Rock Wool.
(4) The Complaint sought an immediate receivership
for the Ekins home (R. 5 and 10).
(5) Mr. Hillman's testimony that the purpose of
these actions was to put pressure on the Ekins to pay Rock Wool's
debt to Heller (Tr. 1380-84, copy attached as Addendum 6).
2.

The finding that Heller impaired the security

consisting of inventory by $25,000.00.

Finding 6 finds that

Heller impaired the motor vehicles in the sum of $43,600.00, the
accounts receivable in the amount of $41,649.00, and the
inventory by $25,000.00.

In this appeal Heller challenges the

admission of the Berman appraisal of the vehicles, but offered no
rebuttal testimony as to value; does not challenge the accounts
receivable figure; and does challenge the inventory loss.
Query, is there any competent evidence establishing
the $25,000.00 figure?

Yes, David Ekins, the manager of Rock

Wool, was asked whether he would have received any more for the
inventory on a going business basis than was received in
liquidation, and Ekins testified he would have received
$25,000.00 more.

On further examination Ekins reiterated and

supported his prior testimony (Tr. 1820-21).

This testimony was

elicited from the person directly in charge of the operation, and
was neither objected to by Heller nor made subject of a motion to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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strike.
Since there is an overwhelming preponderance of
evidence, mostly unrebutted, supporting the only findings of fact
Heller challenges in this appeal, this Court must, by its own
rules, affirm the trial court's findings in their entirety, the
challenged and the unchallenged.

Thus sustained, they compel

affirmance of the conclusions of law and judgment.

POINT III
The Berman appraisal of Rock Wool motor
vehicles was properly admitted. Even if it
had been an error, the error was harmless.
In its Argument VI Heller attacks the appraisal of Rock
Wool vehicles made by Robert Berman and admitted in evidence
below.

Heller contends that an appraiser is by definition an

expert witness; that Rule 703, U.R.E. governs the admissibility
of his opinion; and the Ekins did not lay a proper foundation for
admission of the appraisal.

This evidence was admitted over

Heller's objection.
Missing from Heller's argument is any claim that the
outcome of the suit would have been affected in any fashion if
the Berman appraisal had not been admitted.

Absence materiality

and prejudice an error in an evidentiary ruling does not
constitute reversible error.

In the case at bar, the trial court

held the Ekins to have been released from their Guaranty by
virtue of Heller's impairing its security interest in Rock Wool's
vehicles, in the accounts receivable, and in the inventory—any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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one of which, standing alone, would have triggered the mechanism
of Section 2819, C.C.C., and fully released the guarantor.

At a

minimum Berman's appraisal showed that whether the guarantors
were released ab initio, or at the time of the Heller foreclosure
action, or at the time the vehicles were sold, or at some other
time, the vehicles had a substantial value sufficient to make the
impairment of security a material impairment.

Had the trial

court erred and held that the effect of Section 2819, C.C.C., was
a pro tanto exoneration of the sureties (guarantors), the exact
dollar value would have been necessary to show the dollar value
of the offset.

However, the trial court properly concluded that

any material impairment of security exonerates in full.

Had

Berman's testimony of value been excluded, the outcome would
still have been adequately supported by Heller's impairment of
the other two parts of the security.
The particular alleged error in an evidentiary ruling
would not, even if made, have warranted reversal.

But no error

was made. A careful and adequate foundation for Berman's
appraisal appears in the record.

He was qualified as an expert

in vehicle appraisal (Tr. 1483-4) who had appraised some 10,000
vehicles.

He was given a full description of the vehicles (long

since sold or disposed of) that Rock Wool had as of March 30,
1983 (Exhibit 6).

As a practical matter, a description was all

that could have been given to any expert—the cars were
unavailable.

Using the written description as the factual

premise, he stated his opinion of the value of each vehicle.
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Rule 703 is broader than former Rule 56 and allows an
expert to base his opinion on facts or data not admissible in
evidence if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field.

For example, a psychiatrist testifying as to defendant's

sanity could base the opinion on conversations he had with others
who had dealt with the defendant.

The Court notes that the

expert is fully capable of judging what is or is not a reliable
basis for his opinion, United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 1476, 149
(9th Cir. 1975).

And, contrary to Heller's contentions, Mr.

Berman did not indicate that it was unusual for him to render an
appraisal without seeing the vehicle (Tr. 149).
Even under the more restrictive Rule 56, an expert was
able to testify as to value even though his conclusions were
based entirely upon hearsay evidence.

United States v. 5139.5

Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952); United States
v. Sowards, 339 F.2d 401, 402 (10th Cir. 1964).
There was no other basis to establish value.

David

Ekins was present to be cross examined.
Had Heller actually felt there was error in the Berman
appraisal of the value of the vehicles, it could have called its
own appraiser, given him the very description given Berman, and
put his appraisal in evidence.
discovery or during trial.

This could have been done during

No such rebuttal was offered. Where,

as here—and as in the case of many, perhaps most, opinion
evidence—the opinion must be premised on facts related to the
expert by others, the opinion is not rendered inadmissible
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-^U-

because the observer of the facts does not have the same
background and perception as the expert.

POINT IV
That the Ekins were the controlling stockholders of Rock Wool does not preclude them
from claiming to be released from their
Guaranty, nor does it, under the facts of this
case, require them to ensure that Heller
perfect its security interest in the Rock Wool
assets.
In Argument IV of Appellant's Brief Heller contends
that the Ekins cannot assert a discharge based on Heller's
negligence because they are controlling shareholders. This
Heller contends is established law and is supported by numerous
cases.

For authority Heller cites the Court to six cases. Of

the six cases, two, Rushton and Kruger, are not on point; in
fact, they do not even deal with the issue for which they are
cited.

With regard to the other four, they are the only cases

that can be found to support Heller's proposition.

Thus, while

there is some support for Heller's position, it can hardly be
considered "established law" or "widely recognized."

In truth,

the law is just the opposite.
Heller's argument essentially is that this Court should
not even consider the merits of the Ekins defenses because they
are controlling shareholders and officers of U.S. Rock Wool.

The

following is a list of cases where guarantors who were also
controlling shareholders, officers, or directors of the principal
were permitted to raise suretyship defenses.

In most of the
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cases cited, the guarantors did not prevail on their defenses.
However, it was on the merits that they failed, i.e., the Court
found that they had consented to an impairment, an issue that
would have been moot if control, shareholding, or directorship
precluded them from asserting the defense.

The list is not

exhaustive, even on the one suretyship defense.

No doubt many

other cases could be found if all suretyship defense cases were
surveyed.

The cited cases are:
American Security Bank v. Clarno, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874,

199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984) .
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 540 P.2d 1294
(N.M. 1975) .
Union Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal. App. 296, 126 Cal. Rptr.
646 (App. 1976) .
,;...: r • ,••.. Executive Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Tighe, 32 U.C.C.
Rptr. 894, 445 N.Y.S. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 1981).
Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 1371, 283
A.2d 408 (Md. 1971) .
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Biafore, 18 U.C.C.
Rptr. 519 (3rd Cir. Ct. of App. 1975).
Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 37 U.C.C. Rptr.
502, 645 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1982).
Lawyer1s Title Insurance Corp. v. Northeast Texas
Development Co., 34 U.C.C. Rptr. 604, 635 S.W. 2d 897 (Tex.
1982) .
Wilson v. Baxley State Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rptr. 1550 (Ga.
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1980).
First Nat'l Bank v. Hangen Ford y Inc., 219 N.W. 2d 847
(N.D. 1974).
Peoples Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 209 S.E. 2d
573 (W.V. Sup. App. 1974).
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Post, 293 N.E. 2d 907 (111.
App. 1973).
McHenry State Bank v. Y & A Trucking, 454 N.E. 2d 349
(111. App. 1983).
Peacock v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 454 So. 2d 734
(Fla. App. 1984).
Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 627 P.2d 773
(Colo. App. 1980).
Huey v. Port Gibson Bank, 390 So. 1009 (Miss. 1980).
In Argument IV Heller asserts that its position "is so
widely recognized that one court has stated that it could find
1

. . . n o reported case where a person who has an interest in the

transaction can avail himself of this defense [discharge or
release] where there has been a failure to file a financing
statement.1 Mikanis Trading Corp. v. Lowenthal, 22 U.C.C. Rptr.
1000 (N.Y. 1977)."

Heller's claim is clearly in error as the

above list of cases shows.

In fact, the case cited as authority

for that erroneous proposition, Mikanis, was later overruled by
implication in Executive Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Tighe, 411
N.Y.S. 2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

Tighe involved a creditor which

had failed to perfect its security interest and the guarantors
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were officers and shareholders of the debtor.

The Court

recognized the Mikanis case and yet still permitted the
guarantors to raise the defenses of a failure to perfect.. The
case was modified on appeal for other reasons.

Executive Bank of

Fort Lauderdale v. Tighey 445 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 429 N.E. 2d 1054
(Ct. App. 1981).
Apart from the numerous cases which rebut its position.
Heller's argument is theoretically flawed.

It's argument would

require this Court to ignore the corporate form and to attribute
corporate actions to its shareholders and to require the
shareholders to perform certain acts in order to protect their
own non-corporate interests.

To obtain that result requires a

piercing of the corporate veil, which can be done only upon a
finding that the corporate form was used to perpetrate fraud and
that the corporate entity was a sham.
P.2d 526 (Utah 1973).

Dockstrader v. Walker, 510

Heller has not made such a showing.

In

fact, Heller's argument would require that all shareholder
guarantors be treated as if their corporations were shams.
Heller's argument is also factually flawed.

Heller

contends that the Ekins had an affirmative duty to see that the
security interest was perfected.

This argument ignores the

testimony of Ross Ekins that Heller's agent, Hillman,
specifically told Ekins that he (Hillman) would do the perfecting
(see pages 9 and 10 of Statement of Facts, supra).

It also

ignores the testimony of David Ekins (Tr. 1814) that another of
Heller's agents, Mr. Arterberry, told him that filing the UCC-1
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had perfected the security interest in the vehicles.
Heller is in the business of making secured loans; it
should know what is required to perfect various types of security
interests.
standard.

It chose to have California law, not Utah law, be its
It claimed that it deliberately failed to perfect this

valuable security and then sought to escape responsibility by
lying about its reasons for doing so.

The trial court found as a

fact that Heller undertook responsibility for perfecting this
security interest and held it responsible for the consequences.
Furthermore, even if Heller was correct in its
assertion, it still must fail because the trial court found that
it failed to collect the accounts receivable in a commercially
reasonable manner (Finding 8 ) . This failure, which is entirely
outside the Ekins control, even under Heller's theory, would
release the Ekins.

Under Western Decor & Furnishings v. Bank of

America, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287 (App. 1979), a creditor cannot obtain
a deficiency judgment where it fails to collect the accounts
receivable in a commercially reasonable manner.

POINT V
The trial court was required by California law
to award the Ekins their attorneys fees and
the determination of the proper amount is the
sole province of the trial court.
As indicated in Appellant's Brief, the trial court
awarded attorneys fees and costs to the Ekins on the basis of
California Civil Code, Section 1717, which provides that where a
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contract specifically provides for one party to recover attorneys
fees and costs, the opposing party shall be awarded its attorneys
fees and costs if it prevails.

,.,/.

In the principal action Heller first sought to enforce
its various loan agreements and trust deed against the Ekins home
and in connection therewith sought the entire sum claimed due
from Rock Wool together with attorneys fees and costs incurred in
foreclosing the Ekins Trust Deed which secured the Ekins Guaranty
(R. 5 and R. 9). Clearly Heller claimed to be entitled to
attorneys fees for its efforts in that enterprise.

Under

California law the Ekins would, therefore, also be entitled to
recover their attorneys fees if they were the parties that
prevailed in the foreclosure action.
When Heller later amended its Complaint (R. 303 et
seq.) to include a count for a personal judgment against the
Ekins, it again claimed all expenses, collection charges, court
costs, and attorneys fees "incurred by Heller in the collection
of monies advanced to Rock Wool under the Loan Agreement" (R.
00307) and "Attorneys fees as provided in the Guaranty
Agreement;" and "costs and interest as provided by law" (R.
00314).
It is inconceivable that Heller, had it prevailed,
would have sought against the Ekins anything less than its entire
attorneys fees incurred in any and every aspect of the case. In
fact, Heller in its invoices to Rock Wool (the very invoices on
which it sought to recover against the Ekins under their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Guaranty) included all attorneys fees as they were incurred
(Exhibit CC).

Further, at the close of evidence Heller submitted

its Affidavit respecting the attorneys fees it sought to recover
and included all services of any and every kind incurred in any
aspect of the cause (R. 751-94).

The only justification for this

kind of an award against the Ekins would necessarily have to be
that Heller claimed the Ekins to be responsible for all Heller's
costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in any way connected with the
various agreements, including the Guaranty.

When it thought it

might prevail, Heller took the position that the Guaranty did
provide for the award of all attorneys fees, costs, and expenses
in any way connected with its enforcement, and when Heller did
not prevail, has taken the opposite position.

It should not be

permitted to speak out of both sides of its mouth.
Even more compelling is the wording of the Guaranty
itself, complex, detailed, interwoven with references intra se,
and possibly less than totally clear about the scope of attorneys
fees recoverable by Heller.

Like the other provisions of the

Guaranty, any unclear, obscure, or ambiguous provision must be
construed most strongly in favor of the Ekins.

Please note the

following provisions of paragraph 1 of the Guaranty (Exhibit "F,"
copy appended hereto):
" . . . we, the undersigned, for value
received, do hereby jointly and severally
unconditionally guarantee to you and your
assigns the prompt payment in full at maturity
and all times thereafter . . . of any and all
indebtedness, obligations and liabilities of
every kind or nature . . . now or at any time
hereafter owing to you by the Debtor, . . . or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contained in any other agreements,
undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with
or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also
hereby jointly and severally agree on demand
to reimburse you and your assigns for all
expenses, collection charges, court costs and
attorney's fees incurred in endeavoring to
collect or enforce any of the foregoing
against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any
other person or concern liable hereon; for all
of which, with interest at the highest lawful
contract rate after due until paid, we hereby
jointly and severally agree to be directly,
unconditionally and primarily liable jointly
and severally with the Debtor, and agree that
the same may be recovered in the same or
separate actions brought to recover the
principal indebtedness."
It is inconceivable that Heller would have been willing

to agree that this provision did not require that it be
reimbursed its fees for enforcing the Guaranty had it prevailed
below.

As the record shows, Heller did claim its fees for such

services (supra), thus proving that, until it lost the case, it
interpreted the Guaranty the same way as did the trial judge.
The Ekins submit that the trial court was correct in
entering judgment for attorneys fees, expenses, and other costs
as determined by it, and providing for the supplemental award of
such attorneys fees, costs, and expenses as may be incurred by
the Ekins post-judgment.

On remand the trial court should be

asked to determine the amount of the further attorneys fees,
costs, and expenses, and add them.

Further discussion of this

subject is found in the Memorandum of the Ekins filed at R. 1053
et seq.
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POINT VI
The record is clear that there were no ex
parte communications between the Ekins counsel
and the trial judge respecting the merits of
the case. Ex parte contact respecting
procedural matters is encouraged by the rules
of procedure below.
There is no question but that there were ex parte
communications between the Ekins counsel and the trial judge (R.
878f et seq; App. iv to Appellant's Brief) and between Heller's
counsel and the trial judge (R. 756, 2d line from end; R. 773f
lines 8 and 9 from end; R. 788, lines 14 and 15). As is
discussed below, the record is absolutely clear that there were
no ex parte communications between the Ekins counsel and the
trial judge other than communications respecting procedural
matters such as ascertaining when the trial court could hear
matters pending among the parties.
Heller has leaped from the premise that there were
contacts between the Ekins counsel and the trial judge to the
conclusion that such contacts involved the merits of the cause.
It has made this assertion without any record or factual premise
other than the existence of the contacts between Court and
counsel, and Heller's wholly unwarranted suspicion that the Court
and counsel were engaging in improper and unethical discussions.
The trial record consists of the Affidavit of Tanner explaining
each of the contacts listed in his time sheets (R. 1154-1161) and
the statement of Judge Dee for the record in open court
respecting the nature of those communications.

Tr. 1926-1931,
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the entire statement of Judge Dee on this matter, is appended
hereto as Addendum 7.

For reasons of its own Heller neglected to

put pages 1926-1928 in the extract appended to its Brief..
»-. Mr. Tanner's Affidavit (R. 1154) states under oath the
occasion for and the contents of each contact cited by Heller.
None is a breach of ethics or good faith, and none involved a
discussion of the merits.

A full copy of this affidavit is

appended hereto as Addendum 8.

Heller's counsel filed a

counter-affidavit (R. 1147) which did not even purport to rebut
the Tanner affidavit.
The trial court, after explaining the nature of and
necessity for contacts between trial counsel and the Court, said
(Tr. 1928):
" . . . but I will assure you and your clients
. . . that I was in no way backdoored by Mr.
Tanner. He wouldn't and I wouldn't."
There is a total lack of factual premise upon which
this Court could base a conclusion that either Mr. Tanner or
Judge Dee violated the ethical principles to which they are bound
by oath, or that Heller, whose counsel also made ex parte
contacts with the Court, was deprived of a fair trial. For
supplemental material, including a strong statement of counsel's
view of what it considers to be scurrilous and irresponsible
aspersions, see trial memoranda at R. 1139-44, Ekins' Motion in
Opposition to Appellant's Motion for Summary Disposition, pp.
5-17, and the record of the oral argument of Heller's motion for
a new trial (Tr. 1901-1931, particularly the argument on this
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point at pages 1903-1906f 1913-1918, and 1924-1931).
Heller also failed to prove that the alleged misconduct
was "prejudicial."

Absent prejudice Heller could not be entitled

to a new trial under Rule 61 U.R.C.P.

Error insufficient to

warrant a new trial is insufficient to warrant reversal on
appeal.

Appellant must show the existence of a reasonable

likelihood that unfairness or injustice resulted from the alleged
misconduct.

Ewell & Son v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188f

493 P.2d 1283 (1972).
this burden.

Nothing before the trial court sustains

Even when the affidavits are viewed in a light most

favorable to Heller, they do not show any likelihood of
unfairness or injustice.

The most they show is that there were

several communications by the Ekins1 counsel to the court more
than one year prior to trial concerning matters unrelated to
trial issues; and that one contact occurred during trial and
related to when the trial was to reconvene.
However, Heller contends that any ex parte contact with
the court, even if it is merely to deliver a courtesy copy of
pleadings to the clerk, is sufficient to establish the requisite
prejudice.

In this Heller is mistaken.

Where there is an

allegation of attorney misconduct the Court must still determine
whether it was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.
"The standard for making this determinatin is whether the errors
were 'real and substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed
would affect the result.1"

Nelson, supra at 734, quoting Ivie v.

Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 13, 366 P.2d 781, 787 (1959).
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In other

words, even if it is assumed that the contacts between Ekins1
,- counsel and the trial court were in fact irregularities, Heller
r

must still show a reasonable likelihood that the contacts.
affected the result.

Heller cannot show prejudice by merely

alleging that ex parte contacts were prejudicial.
In Arellano v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 5 Utah 2d
151, 298 P.2d 527 (1956), this court faced a similar argument.
Plaintiff claimed she was entitled to a new trial because of jury
misconduct.

In support of her motion, plaintiff offered three

affidavits which showed that a brother of one of the jurors was
an attorney, that the attorney was heard to say that he knew all
about the case because his brother was on the jury, and finally,
that in jury deliberations the juror led the discussion.

The

plaintiff claimed that the juror had spoken with his brother
about the case and had violated the rule dealing with separation
of the jury.

.

In that case this Court stated:

"Let it be assumed . . . that it had been
proved that the accused juror talked with his
brother concerning the case. Such conduct
violates Rule 47(k). Does such misconduct
require the trial court to grant a new trial?
It is doubted if such misconduct on the part
of a juror, nothing more appearing than here,
would justify the court in granting a new
trial. Certainly the court did not commit
error in refusing to grant the new trial.

w

. . . The fact that a juror has a brother
who is an attorney and that the juror takes
the lead in the jury room is not sufficient
proof of prejudice. Some further proof must
be made that the juror actually conversed with
his brother and that such conversation
influenced the juror so as to prejudice the
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plaintiff's cause. There was no such showing
in the instant case."
Arellano, supra at 529-530 (emphasis added).
See also State v. Packett, 294 N.W. 2d 605 (Neb. 1980), which
held that even where (unlike the case at bar) there were ex parte
discussions on the merits, that alone was insufficient to warrant
a new trial.

In that case, the trial court's determination that

the movant suffered no prejudice was upheld.
Because there is a presumption favoring the validity of
the judgment, Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664
(1966), Heller must show prejudice or have its appeal denied.
There has been no showing of misconduct and not even an attempt
by Heller to show prejudice.

POINT VII
Heller is bound by the trial court's finding
that Heller failed to establish the correct
amount, if any, unpaid by Rock Wool under its
contracts with Heller. This is fatal to
Heller's appeal.
In the case at bar, as in every case seeking damages,
the plaintiff must prove the amount of his loss or damage with
sufficient certainty as to permit the trier of fact to determine
the amount of damages.

Failure to do so is fatal and the trial

court must rule for the defendant.
In a suit on a guaranty, the limit of guarantor's
obligation is to make up the amount or amounts due and unpaid the
creditor by the principal debtor under the contract or contracts
guaranteed.

The evidence must permit the trial court to
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determine the correct amount, or the plaintiff cannot be awarded
judgment.

In the case at bar there is another proceeding pending

between Rock Wool and Heller in the bankruptcy court, but- the
case at bar is the only proceeding pending between the Ekins and
Heller, and it was initiated by Heller.

Rock Wool, a named

defendant herein, agreed with Heller not to participate in this
trial, but to defer to the bankruptcy court to resolve its
account with Heller.

The Ekins made no such agreement.

Accordingly, Heller must have proved the amount of the liability
of the Ekins or Heller cannot have been entitled to either a
money judgment against the Ekins, or a judgment of foreclosure.
Finding 13 reads as follows:
"13. Heller has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence or in any other
fashion the correct amount, if any, remaining
due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its
contracts with Heller."
Since Heller has not challenged Finding 13 in its
appeal of this case and cannot now be heard to complain of it,
Heller has failed to establish an essential element of its cause
and cannot, therefore, prevail in its appeal.
This point alone is dispositive of the Heller appeal.
That the issues Heller did raise on appeal are without merit is
only cumulative.

Nonetheless, prudence requires that the Ekins

respond to each point raised by Heller, and the Ekins have done
:-•?:

SO.

.
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CONCLUSION
In the trial court the Ekins prevailed on four grounds,
first, that under California law Heller's impairment of the
security exonerated the Ekins from their Guaranty; second, that
Heller was in breach of its contracts (the Guaranty and, by
reference, the Mortgage and Security Agreements) with the Ekins,
and therefore could not enforce the Guaranty; third, that Heller
failed to pursue the accounts receivable in a commercially
reasonable manner, thus releasing Rock Wool from liability for a
deficiency, which automatically releases the Ekins; and fourth,
that Heller failed to establish what amount, if any, Rock Wool
owed Heller.

The record below contains some competent

substantial evidence to support each of the findings of fact and
Heller has not even challenged Finding 8, that it failed to
pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, or
Finding 13, that it failed to prove the amount that Rock Wool
owed Heller.

Hence, the only theoretical possibility that this

case could be reversed would be if this Court, against the
unrefuted testimony of Judge Dee and Mr. Tanner, were to somehow
conclude that they had lied, had in fact engaged in ex parte
discussions respecting the merits, and that this conduct caused
the trial to be unfair.

There is nothing whatever in the record

to sustain either misconduct or effect on the outcome.
On the first issue, impairment of security, this Court
could, of course, view the Guaranty and the facts surrounding its
promulgation and execution differently from the Ekins. However,
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even if this Court should somehow conclude that the Guaranty
should be interpreted as consenting to impairment, the judgment
below would nonetheless have to be affirmed on three grounds,
Heller's breach of contract, Heller's failure to pursue the
receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, and Heller's
failure to prove damages.
On the second issue, breach of contract, there is no
question of law involved.

Heller has not, either below or on

this appeal, disputed the principle of law that there is an
implied or statutory covenant of good faith in every contract
controlled by California law.

The only questions raised on this

point are factual; i.e., did Heller do the things that the
findings of fact determined?

The Ekins have recited chapter and

verse of abundant evidence sustaining each finding of Heller's
breach of the covenant of good faith, and the whole structure is
cemented into place by the testimony of Heller's vice president,
Hillman, that he did those things "to pressure [the Ekins] into
making payment."
But even if this Court were to decide in favor of
appellant on the first and second points, it still could not
reverse.

There are the unchallenged findings of fact that Heller

failed to pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable
manner and that Heller failed to prove what amount, if any, was
due from Rock Wool to Heller, thus failing to prove the amount
that should be recovered of the Ekins if Heller did prevail.
Absent proof of the amount due, Heller must fail below and on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this appeal.

In the absence of a finding that it pursued the

receivables in a commercially reasonable manner Heller must fail
below and on this appeal.
It follows that there is no basis for reversing the
judgment below and it must, therefore, be affirmed; that this
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine the
balance of the post-judgment expenses and attorneys fees incurred
by the Ekins; and that the trial court should be instructed to
add to the judgment the sum thus determined.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 1986.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of December, 1986,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument were
hand delivered to the following:
Cary D. Jonesr Esq.
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Appellant
Sixth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410
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ADDENDUM 1

EARL D. TANNER
#3187
BRAD L ENGLUND
#4478
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2021
Attorneys for Defendants
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins
and U.S. Rock Wool Defined
Benefit Trust
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
V. ROSS EKINS; S. O. EKINS;
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings &
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST;
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK,
formerly known as WALKER BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation,

Civil No. C-83-2368
Judge David B. Dee

Defendants.
This matter came on regularly for trial before the
Court on the 25th day of November, 1985, the Honorable David B,
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Dee presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, John

T. Anderson, Esq, and Cary D. Jones, Esq., of Hansen & Anderson;
and defendants V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins were represented by
their attorneys, Earl D. Tanner, Esq. and Brad L Englund, Esq.,
of Tanner, Bowen & Tanner.

On December 6, 1983, defendant U.S.

Rock Wool Company, Inc. (Rock Wool), filed a Petition in
Bankruptcy which case is still pending in the bankruptcy court.
Through their attorney of record, Anna S. Drake of Nielsen &
Senior, Rock Wool and defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit
Trust (the "Trust") advised the Court that they would be bound by
the determination of such issues as were before this Court, as
distinguished from the bankruptcy court, without the presence of
their counsel of record.

Defendant American Savings & Loan

Corporation has been determined to be the first lienholder on the
premises here involved; First Interstate Bank has been heretofore
dismissed by stipulation; and defendant Valley Bank & Trust
Company, a Utah banking corporation (Valley Bank), has stipulated
with plaintiff that the issues involving Valley Bank remaining
undetermined after this trial, if any there be, are reserved for
trial at a later date.

The matter was fully presented, argued

and submitted, and the Court having considered the same and being
fully advised in the premises and having made and entered its
Memorandum Decision herein, finds the facts, makes its
conclusions of law, and directs entry of judgment as follows:

-2-
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 6, 1983, Rock Wool filed a petition in

the Bankruptcy Court at Salt Lake City, Utah for a Chapter 11
reorganization, which was later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, which is still pending in the Bankruptcy Court and
which makes Heller's claims for replevin moot so far as this suit
is concerned.
2.

The agreements involved in this suit specify that

they shall be governed as to validity, interpretation and effect,
and in all other respects by the laws and decisions of the state
of California.
3.

The documents constituting the agreements which are

the subject of this action consist of Heller's usual printed
forms which were provided by Heller and had been prepared by
Heller.

They were signed on or about December 27, 1979.

One of

those agreements was a Chattel Mortgage covering, inter alia,
Rock Wool's motor vehicles.
4.

Heller undertook to perfect its security interest

in all of the security, but negligently or intentionally failed
to properly perfect its security interest in the motor vehicles.
Said failure to perfect impaired that security, was material, and
was not the result of any act, omission, or statement of either
of the Skins'.
5.

Heller impaired its remedies and rights against the
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accounts receivable and inventory of Rock Wool, both of which
were part of the security for the debt referred to in the Ekins'
Guaranty, by cutting off the cash available to Rock Wool and by
giving notice to the account debtors at a time and in a fashion
which it knew would cause the account debtors to stop or slow
down the payment of their accounts and quit doing business with
Rock Wool, which eventually destroyed Rock Wool as an operable
going concern.
6.

The only evidence of the values lost by the

impairment of the said security was furnished by the Ekins' and
showed that the security was impaired in the following amounts:

7.

Motor Vehicles

$43,600,00

Accounts Receivable

$41,649,00

Inventory

$25,000.00

The Ekins1 did not consent to Heller impairing its

rights against Rock Wool or the security for the Rock Wool debt,
nor did they waive their right to complain of such impairment.
8.

California law provides that when a UCC creditor

undertakes to collect accounts receivable security, it has the
burden of proving that it pursued collection in a commercially
reasonable manner.

This Court finds that the only actions taken

by Heller to effect collection was to send out the February
notice, which by its own admission it realized would impede
collection, and to send certain unidentified accounts to an
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attorney in Tucson, Arizona.

There is no evidence as to what, if

anything, the attorney did to effect collection.

This is not

sufficient to meet Heller's burden and the Court finds that
Heller did not proceed in a commercially reasonable manner to
collect the accounts receivable.
9.

The California Civil Code imposes on all parties to

a contract an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement.

Heller has breached this obligation in its

eforcement of the contracts on which it claims the Ekins' are
liable (a) by changing the operating rules on Rock Wool
unilaterally and creating an insuperable negative balance of
accounts receivable security; (b) by giving notice to Rock Wool's
customers which were taken from an obsolete customer list known
by Heller to contain obsolete balances, and doing so at a time
when Heller knew it would receive in a day or two the regular
monthly updated list from Rock Wool containing current
information; and (c) by attempting to coerce the Ekins' by filing
suit without notice or demand at a time Heller knew the Ekins1
were gone from Utah on a multi-year assignment, by claiming an
unconscionably excessive amount, and by seeking the immediate
appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Ekins1 home
and having it sold at a sheriff's sale, all at a time when Heller
was bound by contract not to take action against the Ekins' home.
10.

Heller made a Subordination Agreement with Valley
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Bank at the time the Ekins' were refinancing a short-term note
for $67,000.00 which was ahead of Heller's Trust Deed on the
Ekins1 home.

The Subordination Agreement provided that Heller

could not demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize on the
Ekins1 home, or take any direct or indirect action to foreclose
the Ekins' home or to realize upon its security interest in that
home until such time as the Valley Bank trust deed had been paid
in full.

There was no provision in the Subordination Agreement

entitling Heller to acquire or otherwise satisfy the Valley Bank
loan ahead of its due date and thus accelerate its right to
proceed against the Ekins' home.
11.

Heller's tender of a Cashier's Check in the sura of

$55,000.00 was defective and unauthorized, and Valley Bank's
refusal to accept the tender was not wrongful.
12.

The contracts involved in this case provide for

payment of attorney's fees to Heller in the event of default*
Under California law, if a contract so provides, then the
prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
addition to costs of suit.

In the instant cause each of the

Ekins' is, as to Heller, the prevailing party.
13.

Heller has failed to establish by a preponderance

of the evidence or in any other fashion the correct amount, if
any, remaining due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its contracts
with Heller.

-6-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The transactions involved in all of the causes

between Heller on the one side and the Ekins' or Rock Wool on the
other, except those relating to the Subordination Agreement, are
governed as to their validity, interpretation and effects, and in
all other respects, by the laws and decisions of the state of
California.
2.

The Ekins1 have been exonerated from liability to

Heller under the Guaranty, and the Guaranty should be declared to
have been terminated.
3.

The Ekins* are entitled to a decree that the

obligation secured by the Heller Trust Deed has been terminated
and is at an end? that the property subject to the Heller Trust
Deed should be reconveyed to the Ekins1 free and clear of any
claim or interest of Heller; and the Heller Trust Deed on their
home be released and terminated.
4.

The Ekins' are entitled to be awarded their

attorneys1 fees, costs and necessary disbursements which have
been incurred in this action in an amount to be set by this Court
upon notice and motion and taxed as costs herein.

Said award may

be supplemented upon notice and motion if post-judgment services
are required of said defendants1 attorneys.
5.

The Ekins1 have established grounds for liability

on the part of Heller under their Counterclaim herein, but in
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light of the determination

that they are exonerated and

released from liability under the Guaranty, have not sustained
coata and expenaea as a result of Heller's conduct other than
those attorney's fees, costs, and expenses which are compensated
elsewhere herein.

Accordingly, judgment of no causa of action

should be entered on the Counterclaim.
6.

Defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit Trust is

entitled to judgment of no cause of action.
7.

As to the defendant U.S. Rock Wool, which had filed

a Chapter 11 proceedings in bankruptcy on December 6, 1983 and
waa a debtor-in-poaaeaaion until December 10, 1984, at which time
the proceedings were converted to a Chapter 7 proceedings and a
trustee in bankruptcy appointed, aaid defendant and Heller
treated the matter of the amount, if any, due from Rock Wool to
Heller, or from Heller to Rock Wool under its Counterclaim as an
issue which need not be determined herein except to the extent
necessary to resolve the issue of whether and to what extent the
Ekins* have been released from their guaranty, leaving said iaaue
to be determined, as between themselves, in the bankruptcy
proceedinga.

Accordingly, the issues between Rock Wool and

Heller insofar as they relate to the amounts, if any, which
should be awarded to one or the other, and title and right to
posaeaaion of the personal property of Rock Wool, are held to be
the province of the bankruptcy court, and not precluded by the
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judgment herein.

Subject to the foregoing, each should be

granted judgment of no cause of action.
DATED this £9

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

V/g^
/
2w
District Judge
Approved as to form
this
day of April, 1986
HANSEN & ANDERSON

By
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 2

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICc
Salt Lake Count" Utah

APR 2 9 1986
OistNCourt

EARL D. TANNER
#3187
BRAD L ENGLUND
#4478
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2021

y Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Eki ns
and U.S. Rock Wool Defined
Benefit Trust
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff,
I

JUDGMENT

vs.
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
V. ROSS EKINS; S.O. EKINS;
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings &
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST;
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK,
formerly known as WALKER BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

1
]I

Civil No. C-83-2368
Judge David B. Dee

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
Court the 25th day of November, 1985, the Honorable David B* Dee
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presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, John T.

Anderson, Esq. and Gary D. Jones, Esq., of Hansen & Anderson; and
defendants V, Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins were represented by
their attorneys, Earl D. Tanner, Esq. and Brad L Englund, Esq.,
of Tanner, Bowen & Tanner.

All other defendants remaining in the

action were represented or otherwise before the Court by
stipulation as set forth in the Findings, defendant First
Interstate Bank having been dismissed.

The matter was fully

presented, argued and submitted, and the Court having considered
the same and being fully advised in the premises and having made
and entered its Memorandum Decision herein and its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Laws;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That the Deed of Trust by and between defendants V.

Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins as trustors, and Walter E. Heller
Western, Inc. as beneficiary, respecting that certain real
property in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as "Lot No. 408,
Mount Olympus Park No. 4," which was recorded at Pages 538, 539,
and 540 of Book 5020 of the records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder (hereafter "the real property") be, and the same hereby
is, terminated and released, and the above-described real
property is hereby reconveyed to V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins
free and clear of any obligation to, or claim or encumbrance of,

-2-
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plaintiff Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. and its successors or
assigns*
2.

That defendants V* Ross Ekins, S. 0. Ekinsf and

Valley Bank & Trust Company have judgment of no cause of action
on the claims set forth in the Amended Complaint herein.
3.

That plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action

on the claims set forth in the Counterclaim of defendants V. Ross
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins herein.
4.

That defendant American Savings & Loan Corporation

have judgment that its interests in the real property are those
of a first lienholder, and defendant U.S. Rock Wool Company
Defined Benefit Trust have judgment that its interests, if any,
in the real property are superior to the interests of plaintiff
and are subordinate to the lien of the defendant American Savings
& Loan Corporation.
5.

That defendants V. Ross Ekins, S. 0. Ekins, and

Valley Bank & Trust Company have judgment against plaintiff for
their costs herein, which costs shall, as to defendants V. Ross
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins, include such attorney's fees, costs, and
necessary disbursements as shall be determined by this Court upon
notice and motion.
6.

That defendant U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. have

judgment of no cause of action against plaintiff on the Amended
Complaint and plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action
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against said defendant on its Counterclaim? subject, however, to
the right of each of said parties to take such further action in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, Bankruptcy No. 83A-03213, as either party may
deem appropriate to determine the amounts, if any, which either
of said parties may be entitled to recover from the other, and
the title and right to possession of the personal property of the
bankrupt, U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc.
Made and entered this ^x
* - .

day of April, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

JOdpc

U

^

H.JSliApN hu]MQLEY

^jfii^
sy
Denuty Clerk
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ADDENDUM 3

GUARANTY
To WALTBR B. HBLLBR WBSTBRN, INCORPORATED
Oaca

December

27

19_7_

Genclemani
To induca you co purchase or ocharwita acquire from
* L — t L i — R O C k WOO 1 C O . , I T\Q t
(hereinafter callad "Debcor") account* receivable, conditional sale or lease agreemencs, chaccai mortgages, drafts, note*, bills, acceptance*, ci
receipts, concracct or ochar obligations or choses-tnaction (herein coliecuveiy called "receivables"), or to advance moneys or extend credit to
Debtor thereon, or co factor the sales or finance the accounts of the Debcor (either according co any present or future existing agreement or
cording to any changaa in any such agraamanc or on any other cerma and arrangements from time to urne agreed upon with cha Debtor, her
consenting co and waiving notice of any and all such agreements, cerma and arrange menu mnd changes thereof) or co otherwise directly or
directly advance money co or give or extend faith and credit to cha Debtor, or otherwise atauc the Debtor in financing IU business or sa
(wuhout obligacing you co do any of the foregoing) wa, cha undersigned, for value received, do hereby jointly and severally uncondtciom
guarantee to you mnd your assigns the prompt payment in full ac maturity and all timet thereafter (waiving notice of non-payment) of any *
all indebtedness, obligations and liabilities of every kind or nature (both principal and interest) now or at any time hereafter owing to you
cha Debcor, and of any and all receivables herecofore and hereafter acquired by you from said Debtor or in respect of which che Debtor has
may become in any way liable, and the prompt, full and faithful performance and discharge by the Debtor of each and every one of the ter
conditions, agreements, representations, warranties, guaranties and provisions on che pare of the Debcor concained in mny such agreement or
rangement or in any modification or addenda thereto or substitution thereof, or contained in any schedule or other instrument heretofore
hereafter given by or on behalf of said Debtor in connection with the sale or assignment of any such receivables to you, or contained in any oc
agreement*; undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also hereby jointly and severally agree
demand co reimburse you and your assigns for all expenses, collection charges, court costs and attorney's rees incurred in endeavoring to coJ
or enforce any of the foregoing against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any other parson or concern liable thereon, for all of which, »
interest ac the highest lawful contract rate after due until paid, we hereby jointly and severally agree to be directly, unconditionally and primai
liable jointly and severally with the Debcor, and agree chat the same may be recovered m the same or separate actions brought to recover
principal indebtedness.
Notice of acceptance of this guaranty, the giving or extension of credit to the Debtor, the purchase or acquisition or receivables, or the
vancement of money or credit thereon, and presentment, demand, notices of default, non-payment or partial payments And protest, notice
protest and all other notices or formalities to which the Debtor might otherwise be entitled, prosecution or collection or remedies against the Deb
or against che makers, endorsers, or other person liable on any such receivables or against any security or collateral thereto appertaining, are he
by waived. The undersigned also waive notice of any consents to the granting of indulgence or extension of time payment, the taking and releast
of security in respect of any said receivables, agreements, obligations, indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed hereunder, or your eccepting pan
payments thereon or your settling, compromising or compounding eny of the same in such manner and at such times as you may deem advtsab
without in mny way impairing or affecting our liability for the full amount thereof; and you shall not be required to prosecute collection, •ntoi
mant or other remedies against the Debcor or againsc any person liable on any said receivables, agreements, obligations, indebtednesa or liabilic
so guaranteed, or to enforce or resort to mny security, liens, collateral or other rights or remedies thereto appertaining, before calling on us ;
payment; nor shall our liability in mny way be released or affected by reason of any failure or delay on your part so co do.
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional and continuing and payment of the sums for which the undersigned become liable shall be made
you at your oiiicm from time to time on demand m§ the same become or are declared due, notwithstanding that you hold reserves, credits, collate
or security againsc which you may be entitled Co resort for payment, and one or more and successive or concurrent actions may be brought h«
on against the undersigned jointly and severally, either in the same action in which the Debtor is sued or in separate actions, as often as deem
advisable. We expressly waive and bar ourselves from any right to set-off, recoup or counter-claim mny claim or demand against said Debcor,
againsc any other person or concern liable on said receivables, and, as further security to you, any and all debts or liabilities now or hereaf:
owing to us by cha Debcor or by such other person or concern are hereby subordinated to your claims and are hereby assigned to you.
Bach guarantor shall continue liable hereunder until you actually receive written notice from him by registered mail terminating the sat
at co him; buc cha giving oi such notice shall noc terminate this guaranty as to any other guarantor, nor relieve the one giving such notice frc
liability as co any debt, undertaking or liability incurred or undertaken prior co such time. The death oi any o( the guarantors shall not car mm*
this guaranty aa co hit estate or m% co the surviving guarantors, but the same shall continue in full force and effect until notice or termination
given and received at hereinbefore provided mnd all of said indebtedness, liabilities or obligations created or assumed are fully paid
In case Bankruptcy or insolvency proceadings, or proceedings for reorganisation, or for the ippunumtnt of a receiver, tru»u« or vustodtfor the Debtor or over its property or eny substantial portion thereof, be instituted by or against the Debtor, or if the Debtor becomes msolve
or makes an assignment for the benefit of cradicors, or ectempes to effect a composition with creditors, or encumber or dtspose ol all or a su
stantial portion of its property, or if the Debtor defaults in the payment or repurchase of any oi such receivables or indebtedness as the ser
fails due, or fails promptly co make good any defaulc in respect of mny undertaking, than the liability oi the undersigned hereunder shall
your option mnd without notice become immediacely fixed and be enforceable for che full amount thereof, whether then due or not, the same
though ail said receivables, debts and liabilities has become past due
This guaranty shall mure to the benefit of yourself, your successors and assigns. It shall be binding jointly and severally on the unde
signed, chair hairs, raprasancativat and assigns, regardless of the number o i persons signing as guarantors or the turn or order of their tigmn
This instrument shall be governed mB to validity, interpretation, effect and in all other respects by the laws and decisions ol the State <
California.

L

4241 Park Terrace Dr.
S a l t Lake C i t v , Utah
Residence Address
» iae>«

/r "*

' ~"

vc

V. Rp<ss Skins
S. 0 ,

Ekins
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251Q South State
Salt lake City,

-^

••——

Utah

In consideration of the financial accomodations given or to be given
or continued by Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Bank" hereafter) to
Sonoma O. Ekfns

V. Ross gnd

^ ("Borrower" hereafter) the undersigned agrees as

follows:

Borrower
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Borrower

has the following obligations owing to the undersigned:
Title of obligation or instrument Mortgage
Date of such obligation
December 10, 1980
Due date of obligation
December 10, 1988
Present balance owing
$16,000.00
Security for obligation All of Lot 408, Mount Olympus Park No. 4
has or is proposing to obtain a loan from Bank dated
Mq 7
Y
1 9 8 1 , in the amount of $ 67,000 00 and s e c u r e ( j by the same
security or portions thereof as are presently pledged to undersigned and
described in Paragraph E.
In consideration of the credit extended to Borrower by the Bank, the
undersigned hereby subordinates its security interest in the described security
to the above security interest of the Bank. The Bank may extend, modify or
renew the so secured obligation without affecting this subordination. The
undersigned agrees not to demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize on the
security or the security /interest or to take any direct or indirect action to
obtain or realize such security until such time as Bank is paid in full.
The undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to Bank immediately upon receipt
any of the described security or proceeds thereof.
This Agreement shall inure to and be binding upon the parties and
their successors, assigns and personal representatives.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Agreement as
Of this 7th
(jdy of M o y
, ig£l .
35" ~u '
z6

1>

2

;

,T

U.S. Rock Wool Company
Defined Benefit Trust

II I

'^°i
V . Ross Ekins, Administrator

~\ - m

uuninii

The undersigned Borrower hereby consents to the foregoing Agreement
and agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
DATED this
7th day of M a y

s^b&KU

S^Li^i^ p > t ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
(To be completed i f real estate involved)
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

County of Utah
On the

7th

day of _ May

_> 19_81 t personally appeared before
roe V.Ross & Sonoma O . Ekins, the Borrower, who di^l^acknowledged to me that
he executed the above and foregoing Acceptance.. '
,
My Commission Expires:

H o f ^ ' ftjj&t^'J* j

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

A

Yes, it was .

2

Q

And then U.S. Rock Wool would just put that

3

figure in Exhibit D-8 and 9 and similar reports?

4

A

Right.

S

Q

Now, that figure was determined by the age of

6

the accounts on hand plus some other technical factors

7

that you had negotiated with U.S. Rock Wool?

9

A

Yes, it was.

Q

Now, directing your attention to Exhibit 8,

10

January 21st, 1983, will you tell us how much below the

11

line or overdrawn, as the case may be, U.S. Rock Wool was

12 I on January 21st, 1983?
13

A

Do you want line 10 or line 13?

14

Q

Well, - -

15

A

There are two.

1*

Q

I want the right one.

1*

A

I think you want line 13.

*•

Maybe we're in error.

May I explain the difference between the two?

1*

Q

Would you please?

* I

A

Line 10 indicates the amount of what I call

21
22

over advance or negative availability prior to any borrowing
I that day.

23

Q

Okay.

24|

A

Line 13 is a summation of the entire day's

25

activity.

So line 13 would give the final over advance or
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1
2

negative availability.
Q

So that there were - - there was the ability

3

to draw or permission to draw even though they may have

4

been overdrawn so long as the overdraft wasn't too big?

5

A

6

Q

,,

That's right.
All right.

Will you give us both the figure

7

on the overdraft as you perceived it and then the overdraft

8

plus the advances for the day, for January 21st?

9

A

The overdraft prior to the advance was $2,900.82.

10

After the advance of that day the overdraft went up to

11

$3,827.84.

12
13

Q

And at that time how many qualified receivables

did Heller have on this account?

14

A

$120,462.32.

15

Q

Now, directing your attention to Exhibit 9,

16

first I ask you wasn't Exhibit 9 the first report after

17

you told U.S. Rock Wool that the amount of unqualified

18

receivables was being changed?

19

A

It appears to be, yes.

20

Q

And will you tell us what you showed as the

21
22
23

below the line figure after you had made that change?
A

Prior to any advances for that particular day

the negative figure was $51,716.48.

24

Q

Were there any advances made that day?

26

A

Y e s , there w a s .
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1I

Q

How much?

2I

A

$480.48.

3I

Q

So then below the line how much?

4

A

Totally $52,196.96.

5

Q

So before the corrected or altered perception

6

of the unqualified accounts that took place, as you've

7

designated heretofore, U.S. Rock Wool would have had to

8

have collected about $4,000 worth of their outstanding

9

receivables in order to get back in a positive position

10

with you; is that correct?

11

A

You mean prior to January 26th?

12

Q

Yeah.

13

A

That is correct, yes.

14

Q

And after you told them of the change that had

15

been made by you they would have had to come up with some

16

$52,000 to get back in a positive position?

17

A

'•' •

Q

That's correct.
Yeah.

You expected that that difference would

19

be a difference of some significance to you - - to U.S.

20

Rock Wool when you told them about it, wouldn't it?

21

A

Very definitely.

22

Q

It's a lot higher amount to climb?

23

A

That's correct.

24

Q

Now, there was no alteration made in the

25

Guaranty form with the Ekins, was there, over your usual form)?
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Walter i^.Heller Western
INCOHPOMATCO

L'i^AL NOTJ4

,:

( N o t i c e t o a c c o u n t d e b t o r - pursuant t o
C a l i f o r n i a Commercial c#do s e c t i o n 9318.)

Date of t h i s N o t i c e :

To i

February H, ]')8 3

_^Miai:-Jla4y JLJ^iniL
-1223. aii^lflO. ..ttiSJt
Salt, J^luLJCltYi Ptatk, 9410.1 _ .

The accounts of U.S. Rockwool Company
have been assigned to Walter C. Heller Western Incorporated
including your account in the amount of $ L.213 85
a
* °/ " January Jl, 1983
, as evidenced by the account
card*copy attached hereto.
You are requested to make all *hf,*k? on this and any futur
billiga payable to U.S. Rockwool Company
and/or Walter
E. Heller Western Incorporated, but" mal'l' \\i roctly to:
Waltci' E. Heller Wester i, incorporated
333 Market Street, Suit** J10
San Francisco, Ca. 94 105
PAYMENT TO ANYONE OTHER THAN IIELMJR WILL RESULT IN DOUBLE
LIABILITY FOR T!l tS DEBT.
If any additional information u. rot|uiredf please contact
us *£ (.415) 777-2540.

WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN INCORPOR-

By
/

<MA
^CV
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1

courage to acknowledge that some problems occurred.

2

would respectfully suggest the Court ought to grant the

3

motion to avoid any suggestion later that this matter was

4

decided in any way other than on the merits, on the basis

And I

5 | of the evidence and in the context of regular proceedings.
6 I On the basis of this record, Your Honor, Heller could
7 I never be assured it had its fair shot.

Myself as an advocate

8

perhaps I feel otherwise, but Heller doesn't know that,

9

Your Honor.

10

Thank you.

11

THE COURT:

Heller is going to have to

12

take this Court's representation no acts were made with

13

the Court which in any way influenced the Court's decision

14

in this matter.

15

where the County Clerk works to provide clerks to the courts

16

at his leisure, or at his insistence, and the court

17

heretofore is run with the County Clerk providing clerks

18

who came over here, as soon as the judge left the bench,

And because in a jurisdiction like this

19 I the clerks went back to the clerk's office, and the judge
20

did all the answering in response to the questions.

21

as a matter of sheer fact the judges who preceded me in

22

this function years way before I started practicing, and

23

for the 35 years that I have been involved in the court

24

system, Judges Croft and Ellett and others all answered

26

the telephone because nobody else was here, or their
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1

reporter did, and that's been the function.

We are hampered

2

by the fact that thpre hasn't been a statewide overseeing

3

of this thing.

4

The legislature is busy trying to send money to pump the

5

Great Salt Lake, so they are not going to take over the

6

District Court.

7

jurisdiction which isn't a State function.

8

works for the Sheriff.

9

They are both independently elected officials.

We're trying to work in that direction.

This is the only trial court of general
The bailiff

The clerk for the County Clerk.
And as

10

the Court, to keep the business of the people of this

11

State moving, we have to have someone answer the telephone,

12

so the Court does.

13

are you going to rule on the motion for summary judgment;

14

is this case going to go to trial; are you sure I can summon

15

my out-of-state witnesses and be assured we are going to

16

be going Monday morning; how do we get the other lawyer to

17

withdraw; is there a piece of paper that's there that

18

hasn't been signed, I respond to the same sort of questions

19

that Mr. Willis does.

20

I am going to be talking about the merits of the case, they

21

will just have to assume that in error.

22

about their thinking.

23

their own, think that there's a lot of other things that

24

go on here.

25

any reasonable decision about what went on.

And I respond to questions about when

If from that litigants assume that

I can't do anything

They might even, for reasons of

They weren't present and they couldn't reach
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1

going to have to infer.

And I think that's typical of

2

losers.

3

something wrong with having tried the case before a judge

4

that didn't have any hair or had blue eyes or something

5

else.

6

reach that decision independently.

7

assure you and your clients, and I respect your judgment

8

in this matter as a good advocate, and I think you did

9

an excellent job in this case, that I was in no way

When they lose they try to think there must be

If that's what they want to do, they will have to
And - - but I will

10

backdoored by Mr. Tanner.

He wouldn't, and I wouldn't,

11

and I think they are just going to have to accept that

12

representation.

13

with him at which you were not present would be untrue.

14

I did have conversation, and I did with you, as I did

15

get letters from each of you.

16

unilaterally even though the letters were copied to the

17

adverse party.

18

this was started was out of the State, and I kept trying to

19

put Mr. Tanner's feet in the fire to move it along, as a

20

matter of fact suggesting that he terminate his client's

21

assignment out of the State on an LDS mission to get back,

22

because this is a pretty important case, a pretty harsh

23

rule for me to take.

24

under that thinking, that he would have to quit his

26

religious assignment to come out for this lawsuit.

Not to say that I didn't have conversations

And I suppose that's viewed

But as you recall Mr. Ekins at the time

And I'm sure Mr. Ekins was smarting
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And

1

Mr. Tanner also said I was ruining his summer vacation,

2

a lot of things like that, but I did do those things to

3

try and move the case along.

4

had as far as I remember had to do with keeping this case

5

moving.

6 I Topsy.

In all the conversations I

As you all acknowledge, this case grew like
What initially started out to be a collection

7

matter, because of the posture of the defendants, that

8

this was in some way aggregious conduct on the part of

9

the collector, and because of the California law, it grew

10

a lot.

11

I can't help that.

12

was mindful of that, and I was hoping someplace along

13

the line because of the sum that started out to be collected

14

that we could resolve the issue.

15

the decision on the law as I saw it and the facts and I

16

saw them applied to the law, and I in no way got any

17

input from Mr. Tanner and his office or Mr. Anderson and

18

his office that reflected on my determination of law and

19

fact.

20

It grew a lot more than the money involved, but
That's what you wanted to do.

And I

It didn't happen.

Motion for a new trial is denied.

I made

The stay is

21

denied except as agreed to between counsel without the

22

posting of the appropriate bond as required by the rules.

23
24
25

Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. ANDERSON:
the Court's comments.

Your Honor, I appreciate

Just one matter though.
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One thing that concerns me is that if the Court

2 | is convinced that these conversations with Mr. Tanner took
3I 20 or 30 seconds and was confined totally to scheduling
4

matters, I'm at a loss to know how the Court can allow

5

Mr. Tanner to recover for 12 minutes of time and why the

6

Court - - "'

7

THE COURT:

8]

MR. ANDERSON:

9
10

I can tell you - - - the fact that 20

seconds1 conversation becomes 12 minutes of conversation
on every time sheet that doesn't taint - -

11

THE COURT:

That's an easy answer.

I

12

can give you a straight, easy answer.

Frequently when

13

I'm answering the telephone, because there are three lines,

14

I have to put people on hold,

15

and that's at my client's expense.

16

to pay for my time.

Mr. Tanner says I'm holding,
And somebody has got

That's the business I'm in.

17

I can certainly account for that.

18

I said hold the phone while I get the file, which may be in

19

Mrs. Renshaw!s office, my court reporter, to see what

20

you're talking about, or hold the phone while I pull out

21

those documents that may be on my side bar for the

22

purpose of specifically finding out where they are, I

23

suppose if Mr. Tanner wants to charge his clients for that

24

time while he's waiting, he can, but I don't keep time

26

records.

I'm just responding to the question.
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If in fact

And this

1 I was a complicated case.

And I suppose when a piece of

2

paper might have to do with the question being specifically

3

asked, it may take me some time to get.

4

5

This may come as a surprise to you.

This is

not my only case.

6

MR. ANDERSON:

7

THE COURT:

I appreciate that.

I've other things I'm looking

8

for, and if I can't find it right away I might put

9

Mr. Tanner on hold for 15 minutes while I'm looking for

10

what he wanted me to respond to.

Independently I can't

11

remember the length of that conversation, but I do have

12

occasions when I do have lawyers on hold for some time

13

to find out whether the documents they are talking about

14

have in fact been received in this office or whether they

15

are across the street in the County Clerk's Office, not

16

atypical as what I have here today.

17

courtesy copies, and I don't have the file.

18

I don't have the file is because one of you has asked

19

Mrs. Renshaw, the court reporter, to transcribe the record,

20

and she's got the file.

21

what's in the file, I would have to find out where it is

22

just today.

23

find where Brad or Mrs. Renshaw has got it, and that would

24

account for a lapse of time.

26

Okay.

I've got all your
And the reason

So if you called and asked me

And that might take me a little while, to

And I can explain that.

Thank you.
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FllfO IN C( FRff* OFFICE

HAr H 10 26 AM '86
« ii. • s

EARL D. TANNER
#3187
BRAD L ENGLUND
#4478
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2021

. .,

.

...

. :. 'v A

CLERK

Attorneys for Defendants
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Eki ns
and U.S. Rock Wool Defined
Benefit Trust
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,

!
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

A F F I D A V I T

]
]
)
)
)
)

U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
V. ROSS EKINS; S. O. EKINS;
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings &
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST;
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK,
formerly known as WALKER BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation,

]
)
)
)
)
)
]

Defendants.

)

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

Civil No. C-83-2368
Judge David B. Dee

)
: ss.
)

KA.
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EARL D. TANNER, being duly sworn upon his oathf deposes
and says:
1.

That he has at all times since the commencement of

the above action by the plaintiff been the principal attorney for
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins, defendants therein, and knows
whereof he speaks.
2.

That he has not, at any time during the pendency of

the above-entitled case, discussed the merits of said cause or of
any of the claims of any of the parties thereto with the
Honorable David B. Dee outside the presence of the opposing
counsel.
3.

That it is, and was, his understanding (1) that the

Rules of Procedure of the Third Judicial District require ex
parte contact with the Court, either the clerk or, as the case
may be, the judge, with respect to setting the time when motions
or other matters can be heard? and (2) that once a trial date has
been set it cannot be vacated or changed except by the specific
personal authorization of the judge before whom the trial has
been set.
4.

That your affiant has searched his files, the

pleadings and correspondence, and his personal calendar for
information respecting the reason for and the subject of each ex
parte communication of which plaintiff complained, and has sought
to refresh his recollection of the occasion referred to. The

-2-
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following information respecting each occasion cited by plaintiff
in its motion is, to the best of the information and recollection
of your affiant, correct:
a.

June 11, 1984.
1)

The Background.

Plaintiff had made a motion

for partial summary judgment which was heard on May 3, 1984.

On

June 6, 1984 plaintiff's counsel transmitted to the Court and all
counsel a proposed Order respecting the motion.

Exhibit 1

hereto, a copy of the letter of transmittal, shows that this
office received it on June 7, 1984.
2.

The Occasion.

Four days later, to-wit: on June

11, 1984, your affiant delivered to the Court a letter of
transmittal and a courtesy copy of the Ekins Objections to the
defective proposed Order (Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 hereto) so that
the Court would be apprised that there were objections and would
not sign and enter the proposed Order in the mistaken belief that
all parties affected by it were in agreement with its terms.

The

pleadings were delivered to Judge Dee by leaving the same with
his clerk at his courtroom.

This was done while affiant was on

his way to the office of Mr. Veasy, attorney for Valley Bank &
Trust Company herein, for a pre-arranged conference.

So far as

your affiant is able to determine, no words were exchanged
between him and Judge Dee on this occasion.
b.

July 5, 1984*
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1)

The Background.

On June 27, 1984, Ekins had

filed a motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff
(Exhibit 4 ) , which was noticed for hearing on July 12, 1984
(Exhibit 5 ) .
2)

The Occasion,

On July 5, 1984, your affiant

received a letter from LaVonne Williams, deputy clerk, indicating
that her office had been unable to reach him and that the July 12
setting would have to be rescheduled (Exhibit 6 ) .

Upon receiving

said letter, your affiant tried to contact either Ms • Williams or
Judge Dee and was unable to reach them.

On July 6, affiant was

able to contact Ms. Williams in Judge Hansen's court and was
instructed to re-notice the motion for partial summary judgment
for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on July 27.

Affiant's notes respecting

these contacts and his efforts appear on Exhibit 6.

On July 9,

the re-notice of hearing (Exhibit 7) was served on all parties by
mailing.
c.

July 26, 1984.
1)

The Background.

By order of Judge Dee, over

the vigorous opposition of the Ekins', the case had been set for
trial on August 13, 1984.

The Ekins' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Exhibit 4) which was served on all counsel on June 27,
1984 had been accompanied by a Memorandum.

Despite the Court

extending the time for hearing that motion from July 12 to July
27, Heller had not responded to the Ekins' Memorandum.
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However,

on July 26, the day before the dispositive motion was to be
heard, Heller delivered a letter of transmittal (Exhibit 8) and
its Memorandum to Judge Dee with a copy to your affiant.
2)

The Occasion.

After reviewing the Heller

Memorandum, your affiant contacted Judge Dee by phone to
determine whether he would permit an oral response to the Heller
Memorandum inasmuch as the dispositive motion was set for the
following morning and the case was to be tried some two and
one-half weeks later.

Your affiant told Judge Dee that if he

would permit the oral response to the late filed memo, Ekins1
would not move for additional time but would proceed with the
argument on the following day.
permit an oral response.
taken under advisement.

Judge Dee said that he would

On July 27, the motion was argued and
At the end of the hearing Judge Dee

stated that he would make an early decision on the motion so the
parties could tell what issues would be litigated and what
witnesses would be called and could advise their clients,
d.

July 31, 1984.
1)

The Background.

By the following Tuesday, July

31, no decision on the motion for partial summary judgment had
been received.

Less than two weeks remained before trial and the

motion under consideration would, if granted, relieve the Ekins
of the necessity of trial.
2)

The Occasion.

Affiant called the telephone

5 Clark Law School, BYU.
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number of Judge Dee's court expecting to contact the clerk and
ask him to remind the judge that time was short and counsel were
concerned.

Apparently the clerk was not in because Judge Dee

answered the telephone himself.

Your affiant said he had called

because of the press of time and the needs of all of the parties
to the case, and had expected to talk with the clerk and ask him
to remind the Court of the need for early ruling.

Judge Dee said

he would look at the matter and to call his clerk that afternoon.
Affiant did so and was advised that the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment had been denied,
e.

August 1, 1984,
1)

The Background.

The Court had denied the

Ekins • Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Ekins' had
decided to seek an interlocutory appeal.
2)

The Occasion.

Your affiant contacted the clerk

of the court to determine whether the trial setting would be
vacated as a matter of course and was told that no change would
be made in the trial setting except by Judge Dee himself.
Thereafter your affiant contacted the other attorneys, Veasy and
Anderson, and requested that they stipulate to setting over the
trial date.

Mr. Anderson flatly refused.

Your affiant advised

him that he would move to strike the trial setting and try to get
a hearing as soon as possible, that afternoon if the Court would
permit.

Thereupon your affiant telephoned the clerk of the court

-6
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who said this was a matter Judge Dee would have to decide and put
Judge Dee on the telephone.

Your affiant apprised the Judge of

the Ekins' intent to file an interlocutory appeal, of the failure
of counsel to agree on vacating the trial setting, and of the
motion to strike the trial setting which was then in the process
of being prepared on behalf of the Ekins1.

Judge Dee said he

could hear the matter that afternoon at 3:00,

Your affiant

notified all other counsel of the hearing and caused its motion
to strike (Exhibit 9) to be served by mail and took copies for
the Court and all counsel who would be at the hearing that
afternoon.

Heller's counsel was fully aware of everything that

was being done, since your affiant consulted him with respect to
each step.

He agreed that your affiant would contact Judge Dee

to get a time for the hearing and would contact all counsel when
the time was set.

At the hearing, Heller1s counsel made no

objection or complaint.
f.

The trial setting was stricken,

December 2, 1985.
1)

The Background.

The first two days of trial

had been held on the two days prior to Thanksgiving, 1985.

The

Court could not continue with this trial because of certain
criminal matters which had a priority and at the close of the
second day of trial requested counsel to contact the Court with
respect to the time when the trial could reconvene.

December 2,

1985 was the first working day after the Thanksgiving vacation.
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2)

The Occasion.

Your affiant made two calls to

the clerk of the Court who stated that he had not been advised by
Judge Dee what his plans were with respect to scheduling.

In

each instance affiant was requested to call back later and see
what the status was.

On the third call the clerk passed the call

through to Judge Dee who advised affiant when the trial would
recommence.

Per the Court's instruction and as a matter of

courtesy affiant called Mr. Anderson and told him the time of
reconvening.

Mr. Anderson*s notes show that he also talked with

the Judge on this matter.

DATED this

The trial was reconvened on December

of

May*^E9v6.

D. TANNER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
May, 1986,
v
M±t <' m I xf

,rk . Vy. M # X

^

Notary/Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah

/My Commission Expires:

-8-
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The Honorable David B. Dee
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Walter W. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock
Wool Company. Inc.. «t al.

—Civil No7g-8J-UM

Dear Judge Deet
Enclosed for your examination and signature, please find a proposed Order
Respecting Partial Summary Judgment in the above case. The proposed Order has
been drafted in conformity with a hearing held before you on May 3, 1994. Copies
of the proposed Order have been provided to all counsel of record.
Thank you vary muoh for your attention to this matter.
truly""youra,

John T. Anderson
JTAiclm
Enclosure
oc Anna W. Drake, Esq.
Earl D. Tanner, Jr., Esq.
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
Ted Boyer, Esq.
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Juna 11, 1984

Clark of District Court
P.O. Box 1860
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Rat

Hallar vs. U. S. Rock Wool Company, at al

Dear Clarkt
Enclosed plaaaa find *n Objection to Propoaed Ordar f
Partial Summary Judgment and Ordar Respecting Partial Summary
Judgment, In tha above-captloned matter, for filing with tha
Court.
Thank you for your asaiatance.
Very truly yours.

Z+s S%—i $ks
Carl D. Tanner, J r .
EDTJRiwt
Enclosures
cct John T. Anderson, Esq.
Theodora Boyer, Esq.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
W. Jeffrey Plllmore, Esq.
Anna Drake, Eaq.
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3

4 II
A t t n * , for

5

Defendants

V. Rosa Ekina and S. 0. Ekins

6
7
8

IN THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

9

STATB OP UTAH

10

WALTER £. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,

11
12

15
16
17
lli
19
20

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

13
14

)

vs. 'r-"

) '

C
No. C83-2368
Judge David B. Lee

U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS
EKINS; S.O. EKINS; AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN CORPORATION,
A Utah Savings * Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY
OEPINEO BENEFIT TRUST; and
PIRST INTERSTATE BANK, formerly known as WALKER BANK k TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation,

21
Defendants.
22
23
Defendants v. Ross Ekins and s. O. Ekins by and through
24
their counsel, object to entry of the order respecting partial
25
summary judgment proposed
26
V

Walter F. HalUr Western ^y^.'i.''-*'*
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aiu defendants object to the

1

proposed Order upon the grounds that it does not accurately

2

reflect the stipulation presented to the Court.
Attached hereto aa Exhibit "A" is an Order which store

3
4

accurately reflects the aforesaid stipulation.
i/

DATED this jl

5

day of June, 1984,.
Earl D. Tanner
Earl D. Tanner, Jr.
TANNER,

6
7
8
9
10
11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

12
13

I certify that on the //***day of June, 1984, I sailed
14
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Proposed
15
Order for Partial Summary Judgment, postage prepaid, to the
16
following!
17!
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

Anna Drake, Esq.
NEILSEN 4 SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
59 W. Broadway
4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
175 S. Main
• 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

26
imnmm
ifssnciAfc
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1

2
3
4
5
6
7

all

Theodore Boyer, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 6 CAHOON
77 W. 2nd £«
• 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
John T. Anderson# Esq.
SO W. Broadway
• 1200
Salt LakM f i t y , UT 84101

^^^Lx

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
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^

*rt
EARL D. TANNER
#3187
EARL 0. TANNER, JR. #3188
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 •
Telephonei (801) 583-2021
Attorneys for Defendants
V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF

vs.
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS
EKINS; S.O. BKINS) AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN CORPORATION,
a Utah Savings fc Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK fc TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking eorporat Ion; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY
DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; CARY
O. JONES, successor trustee;
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK,
fomerly known %m WALKER BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. C83-2368
Judge David Dee

Defendants V. Ross Bkins and S. 0. Ekins <"Ekins"),
through their counsel, hereby move the court pursuant to Rule 56
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^_•

..Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of partial nummary
judgment that the Trust Deed attached as Exhibit

A* to the

Amended Complaint is votd *rtrt nneril nr ceable and that plaintiff i
not entitled to attorney's fees incur red in, connection, with i's
attempted foreclosure.
This motion is based upon t h* »yb |e*,* t Ti nat De ed, i he
accompanying Certificate of the Inaurance Department of the Stat
ot

Utah; the accompanying i 'er t, 11 i .„ lit <\ of the Executive

Department, Office of Lieutenant Governor, State of til ah

the

accompany (riKj Memorandum of Points and Authorities; and the file
herein.
Dated this QM

r

day

June, 1984,
EARL D. TANNER
EARL D, TANNER, JR.
TANNER, BOWEN k TANNER

for Defendants
ins and S 0. Skins
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CERTIFICATE OK SERVICE
I certify that on the £2^*day
the foregoing MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

of June, 1984, I serve*
JUDGMENT

AGAINST

PLAINTIFF by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, poatage
prepaid, to the following}
Cary 0. Jonea, Esq. and
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN, JONES MAYCOCK 4 LETA
Suite 1200, Valley Tower
SO West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Anna W. Drake, Esq.
NIELSEN 6 SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM fc HATCH
400 Valley Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ted Boyer, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS fc CAHOON
200 American Savings Plasa
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-3-
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#3187
EARL D. TANNER
EARL D. TANNER, JR. #3188
TANNER, BOWEN fc TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone! (801) 583-2021
Attorney for Defendants
V. Rosa Ekins and s. O. Ekins
IN THE THIRD JUDIICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AMI) KOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs,
INC. ,
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC
a Utah corporation) v. ROSS
EKINS; S.O. EKINS) AMERICAN
SAVINGS fc LOAN CORPORATION,
A Utah Savings k Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK 6 TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation) U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY
DEPINED BENEPIT TRUST) and
PIRST INTERSTATE BANK, formerly known as WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation,
Defendants.
TOl

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OP HEARING

Civil No. C83-2368
Judge David Dee

)
)
)
)
)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OP RECORD HBRIINt
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c

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Motion For Partial Suaunar
Judgment Against Plaintiff of defendants V. Ross Ekins and S. '
Ekins will be heard before the Honorable David Dee on the 12th
day of July, 1984, at 8:45 o'clock a.m. or as soon thereafter i
counsel may be heard at the Salt Lake County Courthouse, 240 EJ
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
DATED this 3 ^

day of June, 1984.
TANNER, J^OWEN k TANNER
BY :^ ___

_,

for v. Rosa Ek ins
and ST O. Ek ins
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone! (801) 538-2021
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
J i,;€!'llf|" that on the ^ ?

day of June, 1984

t

mmi

a tn ie and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing,
poatage prepaid, to t h«e following t
Cary D. Jones, Esq* and
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN, JONES, KAYCOCK k LETA
Suite 1200, Valley Tower
SO West Broadway
- Salt Lake City, UT 84101 "
Anna W. Drake, Esq.
NIELSEN £ SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
BIBLE, HASLAM fc HATCH
400 Valley Tower
Salt Lake City, utan tjHiOl
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ted Boyer, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 4 CAHOON
200 American Savings Plata
77 Meat 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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JUL
EARL D. TANNER
1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

HU.Y

b HEC'U

I, 1»)8

TANNER ,* TANNER

DEAR MR. TANNER,
OUR OFFICE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REACH YOU KECAURDINC CASK
NUMBER C83-2368, WALTER

E. HELLER WESTERN

INCORPORATED. VS.

U.S. ROCK WOOL ET. AL., THE ABOVE NAMED CASE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
SCHEDULED BY YOUR OFFICE FOR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

ON'JULY 12,1984 AT 8:45 A.M. BEFORE JII DCK DAVID B. DEE. BECAUSE
OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE ON JULY 12, AND 13, WE NEED TO
RESHCEDULE YOUR MOTION.

WE APPOLOC T;'. E FOR THE CONTINUANCE.

WOULD

YOU PLEASE CONTACT ME AT YOUR CONVENIENCE TO CET A NEW DATE FOR
HEARING?
S INCEREI.Y

)

( V ^ I - O-x
V\XX>LA^^'VLAVONNK
DKPUTY

WILLIAMS
COURT

SiS-ySOd

. _

.

J

>

OK

<

•

<

Cl.KRK
V I *> 5 1 1 1

•

-

J/^^J.

;

•

-

(

.

c-Y,'

<•

>€

•'

(S*"*^

(LuJ-

*~3>f- 1677
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JULY

3,

1984

C H 1-1M<> 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CKRTIFY THAT I MAll.Kl) A TKUK COPY OK Till: KORKCOJ NC
LETTER

POSTAGE PRE PAID TO FOLLOWING COUNCKL:

EARL D TANNER
1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H4111
GARY D. JONES, ESQ. AND
JOHN T. ANDERSON, ESQ.
SUITE 1200,.VALLEY TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H4101

ANNA W. DRAKE, ESQ.
1100 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H 4 1 U

W. JEFFREY FILLMORE, ESQ.
PAUL VEASY
400 VALLEY TOWER
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H/. 1 n 1

PAMELA T. GREENWOOD
175 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

TED BOYER, ESQ.
200 AMERICAN SAVINGS PLA/.A
77 WEST 200 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

OOAAAAL
DATED W H S

3rd DAY OF JULY 1984
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EARL O. TANNER
#3187
EARL O. TANNER, JR. #3188
TAMMBR, BOWEN * TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephonei (801) 583-2021
Attorneya for Oefendanta
V. Roaa Bklne and S. O. Bklne
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AMD POR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
>

Plaintiff,

RE-NOTICE OP HEARING

va.
U.8. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation} V. ROSS
EKIMBf S.O. EKINSf AMERICAN
SAVINGS k LOAM CORPORATION,
a Utah SavInge t Loan corporation! VALLEY BANK k TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporAtion; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY
DSPIMBD BSMEPIT TRUST| CARY
0. JOME8, eucceeaor truetee$
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK,
formerly known aa WALKER BANK

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

lb TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking
corporation,

)
)

Dafandanta.

)
•"

TOi

"

Civil MO. C83-2348
Judge David Dae

11

THE ABOVB-MAMBD PLAIMTIPP AMD ITS COUNSEL OP RECORD HEREIN;
PLEASB TAKE NOTICB that tha Notion for Partial Suamar*

Judgment Against Plaintiff of defendanta V. Roaa Bklna aad S. O.
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o
Eklna achadulad for haarlng bafora th« Honorabla David Daa on t
12th day of July, 1984, at 8t45 o'clock a.*., h*» baan aat ovar
at th* Inatruction of »U* Cuuii to th« 27th day of July, 1984, *
IOIOO

a.a. or aa aoon tharaaftar aa counaal atay t»* iiaard. »i tn.

Salt t*ka County Courthouaa, 240 Eaat 400 South, Salt Laka City.
Utah 14X11.
OATBD thla 9th day of July, 1984.
EARL ». TANNER
EARL D. TANNER, JR.
TANNER, BOWEN ^ T A N N E R

J?A
D*K+ n d a n t *

-S» »H1». f*
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I certify that on the 9th day of July, 1984, I served
the foregoing RE-NOTICE OP HEARING by mailing a true and correct
copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the followingi
Cary D. Jones, Esq. and
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN, JONES HAYCOCK 4 LETA
Suite 1200, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

\

Anna w. Drake, Esq.
NIELSEN * SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
W. Jeffrey Plllaore, Bag.
BIBLE, HASLAH 4 HATCH
400 Valley Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Panela T. Greenwood, Esq.
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ted Boyer, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 4 CAJIOON
200 American Savings Plass
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Hansen Jones Maycock & Lata
Sixth Floor. Vfcttoy Towar Butfding
6 0 W*a* Broadway
Salt Laft* City. Utah 6 4 1 0 1

J Gordon Manaan
Gary 0 Jonaa
Junn 8 MayCOCfc
Oavid g Lata
Rooart C Oalanunty
Stuart A Ff&rwn
John r Andaraon
j a n a f Harriaon
Mtohaat N £mary
Mtonaat? jonaa

Tatapnona

Ainu m i
5327520

July 26, 1984

HAND-DELIVERED
The Honorable David B. Dee
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock Wool Company, Inc., et al.
- — —
—
Cflvil No. C-83-2368
Dear Judge Deex
Enclosed for your consideration please find Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant E kins' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Hearing on
that motion is presently set for Friday, July 27, at 10:00 a.m.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
V

^Jfery tadtysyours,

John T. Anderson
JTAsclm
Enclosure
cc Anna W. Drake, Esq.
Earl D. Tanner, Sr.f Esq.
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
Ted Boyer, Esq.
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« • COWTM «TATS ( T M H T

o

•ALT LAKS CITY. UTAH • « • 11
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3
4
5

Attonmrm tor Defendants
V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins

6
7

a

IN THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY

9

STATE OF UTAH

10
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,

11

)
)
)
)
)

12
Plaintiff,

13 J

Civil No. C83-2368
Judge David B. Dee

vs.
14
IS
.16

17
10
19
P.O

MOTION TO STRIKE TRIAL
SETTING

U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS
EKINS; S.O. EKINS; AMERICAN
SAVINGS 6 LOAN CORPORATION,
A Utah Savings 6 Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK 4 TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporat ion; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY
DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; and
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, former\y known as WALKER BANK 4 TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation,

21

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

no

23

Defendants V. Ross Ekins and S.O. Ekins, by and through

24

their attorneys, move the Court to strike the setting of the

\b

above-entitled action for trial on August 13, 1984 pursuant to

6

Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.3(a)

if
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^

1

>f the Roies of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit

2

u.-

h#

tate ot Utah.

3

Good cause tor striking sani •• iti Main exisia in that

4

these defendants propose to petItion the Supreme Court to grant

5

an interlocutory appeal

6

for Partial Summary Judgment.

7

imiAiiM

8

entered.

9

demonstrated

HI IHJ 1 y \\,

M o m I lm fourt's denial of their Motion
Minute -"i-™ n

waa

l^oi ouc «.••« formal order lias not. yet been

Such A petition for J I U H I iinuiiiry ap|.i«rtl is proper ata
the case -jt Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d. 435,

10
11

Grounds

an appeal before final

12

t

13

successors ••«"» *« unou«

14

deed is fundamental

lb

I

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26

isolution ut «...„

judgment

umin

in

question ot trie authority of «he
«<< m i ' lal < • ustee to foreclose a tru:
tubstantial portion of this litigation
defendants' position that such a trust

deed is void ab initio or that such a ti ISUJH I A- ha power to
foreclose; Valley Bank k Trust , American savings and Loan, U.S.
Hock Wool Company iwfin<a<1 h«n«)fit Trust, and First Interstate
Bank will not be necessary parties to this action; the effect of
t

/ Bank subordination agreement upon Heller's ability tc

foreclose will not be an issue nor will associated problems of
the single action rule; Heller's contested "tender - to Valley
Bank will be moot; whether the trustee (Cary D. Jones, Esq.)
necessary party will be moot; anc the propriety of Harmon,

Tones

-K & Leta'a judicial foreclosure *,t A trust deed whose
trustee is a member of their firm will lie imi

the validity

. aowun
MMM
•MPtclAk

rewuM

•
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1

of the proposed foreclosure and sale of the Ekins* home will be

2

determined in advance of judgment.

3

Equally important, the issue presented for appeal is on

4

of general concern to the community.

5

from Utah Land Title Association's ULTA Newsletter (April, 1983)

6

shows, there is presently no authoritative answer to this coamon

7

title problem.

6

in many transactions by providing a needed title standard.

9

Resolution of this matter may remove uncertainty

i>r
Dated this* _/

10

As the attached excerpt

day of August, 1984.
TANNER, BOWE.N 4 TANNER

11
12
13
14
1!5
16
7

9
0
1
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1
2
3
4
5

CERTIFICATE Ok MAILING
I car* i|y »M.M on ( h<t /^jf". ijd^

ot

August, 1984, I mull

a true and correct copy of «: h* foregoing Motion to Postpone
Trial, postage prepaid, to the following:

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
lb
16
17
18
19
20
21

Carey D. Jones, Esq.
John T. Anderson, Esq.
HANSEN, JONES, MAYCOCK & LETA
Suite 1200, 50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Anna w. Drake, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Benefical Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq.
BIBLE, HASLAM k HATCH
Suite 400, Valley Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq.
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84 11)
Ted Boyer, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS fc CAHOON
200 American Savings Plaza
7 West Second South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

<3L.

*£

22
23
24
25 ||
26
•OWIN
INCH
•ntiAA.
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THE COMMISSIONER'S CORNER
i now bacoma battar acquainted
I varioua punitiva orders avail>m this office end used where
lata after administrative procesolving a licanaaa. In sequence
ily they includa:
official letter of raprimand into carry soma cumulative effect
ipacl to later complaint* but
mora severe panalty la not cur*
arrantad.
ordar imposing a fine, which it
ks tha imposition of a fina in
mattara. Such an ordar will
ilao require llcanaa auapanaion
ation if unpaid aftar $ specified
order auspanding a licenea for
fiad term
)rder of licanaa revocation,
alactad to add an additional
tha Commissioner's repertoire

liflMftL
VIBM!
jf ua nave been faced with the
i where we encounter a reDeed of Trust that names, aa
a peraon or entity that la not
to act as *uch under the terms
§ 67-1-21(1). It haa been my
ind practice that by subatitutquailfied Trustee, you could
ceed to have the Substitute
econvey tfie Deed of Trust or
[he power of sale given to qualities by UC.A §67-1-23.
•r, a recent decision out of tha
net Court in and for BOM Elder
eld that the Substitute Trustee
situation cannot exercise tha
sale and that the Deed of Trust
foreclosed aa a Mortgage.
B IOWA I. et at va. W BLAINE
H, #t. al. Civil Number 17472
Ct.. Ut March 4, 1003). The
not disturb the priority of tha
eed of Truet in reaching ita
lion that the Deed of Truet
foreclosed Judicially aa a
jrt relied on tha language of
S7-1-22(1) which providae In
he time the Substitution la
record, the new Truatee shall
i to all the power, duties,
y end title of tha Trustee
i the Deed of Trust and ot any
or Trustee."
i original Truatee waa unquah
under Utah Law. tha aucceea acquires no power, dutiea
ty from the ongmel Truatee
-n».*» **t*r\g\f\i

nmjrmmgi
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of available caaa closing documents.
Tha additional form is intended aa tha
counterpart of the letter of reprimand
and will be uaad as a letter of appreciation or compliment in thoae frequent
caaes where the complaint is inspired
by misunderstanding, or sometimes
even a vengeful desire to 'stick the tine
company" I am very well aware of the
prediction of ineureds and others to
blame closing officers or agents generally tor problems which reeh^ result
from their own poor judgment. While I
do not minimize our fiduciary or professional responsibility to buyers, sellers,
lenders and borrowers generally. I also
recognize their desire to consider us aa
effectual guarantors of the eternal happiness of each and every party to each
and every transaction, however, laced
with potential diaaatar for causes beyond the scope or control of the li-

e opinion
of one State District Court Judge and
does not carry the weight or finality of a
Utah Supreme Court Decision However, the Court's reasoning is not faulty
even if it does ignore the practical consequences, and we must develop
appropriate policies to guide our businesses in dealing with this new issue
Sincerely,
Rodney M Pipella
Counsel. Security Title C o /

censed agenta.
I em delighted at my opportumllee to
make a more frequent uae of tha thank
you" type closing document than the
four enumerated above. Stay out of
"flaky ' transactiona If the deal do#sn t
make sense to you it probably won't to
the parties involved either. They will
always aasume you not only understand
the details but also Know a will be discharged without any complication. Tha
careful escrow officer will uae his "aiath
sense" to detect in advance and avoid
the inchoate law suit just looking for a
place to light and the questionable doeing which may wail end up bearing tha
next insurance Department file numtm.
Lewt* $ LwnQiloa
Title Market Conduct Enemmet
(Reminder; Agents are to file financial
statements by April 3 a 1tt3. pursuant
to section 31-26-26 (2) J
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